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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation theorizes recent political events in South Korea. It consists of 
three separate essays which proceed chronologically and are united by their critiques of the 
culture and government of South Korea. 
 The first essay concerns the 2006 debate over South Korea’s founding that was 
shaped by two opposing achievements: the establishment of the Korean Provisional 
Government in 1919 and the creation of the South Korean government in 1948. Drawing 
on the fact that the majority of the South Korean population supports the former, I argue 
that the South Korean approach to founding is deeply tied to the issues of national identity 
and past history and the notion of “We, the People” as a cultural and historical concept. 
Deviating from the notion of individual rights and liberties, the South Korean case sits 
outside the existing perspectives—both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist—on 
founding. 
 The second essay addresses the 2015 agreement between South Korea and Japan 
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on the issue of the Korean comfort women during WWII. I demonstrate that emotions—
specifically, an intense culture-bound sentiment called han—takes the center stage when 
dealing with issues of justice and moral concerns in Korea. The result is an emergence of 
an affective, historically-generated moral paradigm that is determined, not by the force of 
reason and logic, but by victimhood. I conclude that while such a standard of justice may 
be difficult to grasp for non-Koreans, it is easily understandable from the Korean 
perspective. 
 The third essay deals with the candlelight protests of 2016-2017 that led to the 
impeachment of the former President Park Geun-hye. I analyze the causes of the 
candlelight protests of 2016-2017 with a view to investigating the distinctive characteristics 
of political protests in South Korea. I argue that while the common understanding of 
political protest is that it is a sign of a successful democracy and a symptom of healthy civil 
society, the South Korean situation suggests an alternative perspective; that it is instead an 
indication of a serious political dysfunction and an absence of an unconditional support for 
democracy. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
 This dissertation theorizes recent political events in South Korea. Just thirty years 
ago, South Korea was a budding democracy. Forty years of repression under the successive 
dictatorships of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan offered little space 
for discussions of freedom, rights, equality, and justice. Such notions did not enter the 
political lexicon until the late 1980s when South Korea finally instituted a direct 
presidential election and transitioned to democracy. Today, South Korea is known as one 
of the most enduring democracies in Asia with a vibrant economy and dynamic citizenry. 
According to political scientists Gi-Wook Shin and Larry Diamond of Stanford University, 
South Korea is political proof that liberal democracies can take root in the Confucian 
cultures of Asian countries.1  
 This dissertation paints a much less flattering picture of the state of South Korean 
democracy. It consists of three separate essays which proceed chronologically and are 
united by their critiques of the culture and government of South Korea. The first essay 
concerns the 2006 debate over South Korea’s founding that was shaped by two opposing 
achievements: the declaration of independence from Japanese colonial occupation and the 
establishment of the Korean Provisional Government in 1919 and the adoption of a 
                                          
1 Larry Jay Diamond and Gi-Wook Shin. New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and 
Taiwan. Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2014). 
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democratic constitution and the creation of the South Korean government in 1948. In the 
Western tradition, founding is typically associated with constitution-making; the 
assumption is that the form of constitution is what guarantees freedom. Hence, from this 
perspective, South Korea was founded in 1948 with the adoption of its first constitution. 
Yet, few Koreans would identify 1948 as an authoritative year. First, the events of 1948 
were neither self-motivated nor self-driven by South Koreans themselves; second, South 
Korea’s inaugural government of Syngman Rhee did not establish a tradition of democracy 
but that of authoritarianism; and third, constitutionalism and the notion of the rule of law 
carried little force in the post-war Korean context. The year 1919, on the other hand, attracts 
support because it represents Korea’s independence struggle against Japan and the exercise 
of self-rule through the Korean Provisional Government. I argue that in the absence of a 
strong link between constitutionalism and democratic foundation and a clear notion of 
individual rights, the South Korean conception of founding is best understood as being 
cultural and historical in nature. The moral foundation of South Korean democracy, in other 
words, resides in the “Koreanness” of the actors involved, not in their agency as an 
autonomous, rights-holders.  
 The second essay addresses the 2015 agreement between South Korea and Japan 
on the issue of the Korean “comfort women”—women who were drafted as sex slaves 
during WWII by the Japanese military. At first, the agreement appeared to have 
successfully resolved the problem, offering the victims an apology from the Japanese Prime 
Minister and financial compensations. But the reactions of the surviving victims—pouring 
 
3 
out anger at the vice foreign minister and yelling, “Why are you trying to kill us twice?”—
broadcast worldwide left many wondering if South Korea is indeed a democracy. If 
democratic deliberation means being able to control one’s emotions and engage in reasoned 
arguments in search of a viable solution, then the scene suggested otherwise. But how could 
this be when Korea is one of the most successful democracies in Asia? I argue that the 
answer can be found in the peculiar concept of han, an intense feeling of sorrow, yearning, 
and anger located at the deepest-end of the Korean psyche stemming from Korea’s sad 
history and stringent Confucian tradition. What the episode suggests is that emotions take 
center stage when dealing with issues of justice and moral concerns in Korea. The result is 
an emergence of an affective, historically-generated moral paradigm that is determined, not 
by the force of reason and logic, but by victimhood. I conclude that while such a standard 
of justice may be difficult to grasp for non-Koreans, it is easily understandable from the 
Korean perspective. 
 The third essay explores the relations among popular protests, law, and political 
change in South Korea. Specifically, it deals with the candlelight protests of 2016-2017 
that made international headlines from late 2016 to early 2017. In October 2016, a major 
political scandal involving Park Geun-hye, the former South Korean President, and Choi 
Soon-sil, Park’s mysterious friend of forty years, splashed across the front pages of 
newspapers and televisions screens. The scandal, as known as “Choi gate,” brought to 
surface the allegations that Choi, who held no official title or position, had been meddling 
in state affairs and building tremendous wealth and power using her connection to the 
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president. Over the course of four months, hundreds of thousands of people took to the 
streets calling for Park’s ouster and, in March 2017, the Constitutional Court formally 
removed Park from office. With the success of candlelight protests, South Korea was 
widely praised as a model of dissent to follow. I argue that such a view, however, is 
unwarranted. There are two factors that motivated the demonstrations: first, the personal 
oddities of Park and her bizarre relationship with Choi; second, the continuation of 
government practices that bear the mark of Park Chung-hee, Park’s dictator father, and the 
deep political and socioeconomic divisions and inequalities resulting from it. I argue that 
while the common understanding of political protest is that it is a sign of a successful 
democracy and a symptom of healthy civil society, the South Korean situation suggests an 
alternative perspective; that it is instead an indication of a serious political dysfunction and 
an absence of an unconditional support for democracy. 
 In discussing the three issues, my analytical approach is comparative—focusing 
on the cultural and historical aspects of South Korean society that influence the nature and 
character of South Korean democracy—and the voice through which I speak is Eastern, 
specifically South Korean. The claims that I make are based not only on observations but 
also on my lived experience as a South Korean in South Korea; in this sense, the study has 
an anthropological dimension. The obvious challenge to this approach is that the 
conceptual lens through which I theorize is primarily Western for reasons that have much 
to do with the origin of the field of political theory as well as that of democracy itself. My 
intention, therefore, is to offer a perspective that requires one to think outside the box and 
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can turn the existing paradigms on their head. 
 Not unexpectedly, the result of this study is a theory of difference rather than 
equivalence. The notions of founding, morality, justice, political protest, and democracy 
that emerge from the three essays depart from the dominant ones, casting doubts on the 
possibility of identifying a common language that can serve as universal categories to 
overcome the so-called East-West divide.2 As I demonstrate, concepts such as the rule of 
law are rarely received the way it is conceived in the Western context and instead is always 
filtered through the lens of culture and history. The differences are, in other words, real, 
and the particularities associated with culture and history, more tenacious than one may 
wish to believe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
2 Loubna El Amine, "Beyond East and West: Reorienting Political Theory through the Prism of 
Modernity." Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (2016): 102-20. 
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We the Korean people: The 1919 vs. 1948 Debate and the Problem of Founding in 
Contemporary South Korea  
 
Introduction 
 Contemporary debate over South Korea’s founding began at the tip of a pen. In a 
July 31, 2006 opinion piece featured in Donga Ilbo, one of South Korea’s leading 
newspapers, Lee Young-hoon, an economics professor at Seoul National University, 
proposed the creation of a National Foundation Day. Drawing attention to the fact that there 
have never been government initiatives to commemorate the nation’s founding, he wrote:  
  
The secondary school history textbooks sponsored by the government makes no 
reference to “the founding of the Republic of Korea (RoK)” whatsoever. It merely 
reduces the founding of the Republic of Korea to the establishment of the South 
Korean government which took place against the national will for a unified Korea. 
“As one sows, so shall he reap,” they say. It is indeed not at all surprising that the 
younger generation does not know when the country was founded. Moreover, the 
commemorative events of the National Liberation Day1 held annually have never 
included honoring of the nation’s founding. The occasion is remembered solely as 
                                          
1 National Liberation Day is August 15, 1945. It is called Kwangbok-jeol (“광복절”), which literally means 
restoration of light. The day marks Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial occupation. 
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the day of liberation. In other words, the Republic of Korea does not have what all 
other nations have: the Day of National Foundation. 
 
He continued: 
 
If I were asked which is more important, our liberation (from Japan) in 1945 or 
the adoption of a constitution in 1948, I would not hesitate to say that it is the latter. 
The establishment of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea was the first time 
in our two thousand year history that “the sovereignty of the people” was 
proclaimed and “personal freedom” was guaranteed. The significance of a 
constitution in the development of human civilization cannot be overstated. Our 
liberation from Japan in August 1945, on the other hand, stirs little emotions in 
me. It may have been a deeply moving experience for the people who lived through 
it but the same kind of reaction cannot be expected from a person born later in 
time.2 
 
 Whatever the intention, Lee’s comments marked the start of an intense debate on 
                                          
2 Lee Young-hoon, “Let’s make a National Foundation Day,” Donga Ilbo, July 31, 2006. 
http://news.donga.com/3/all/20060731/8335196/1. Note that the English translation is mine. The original 
text was written in Korean. 
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South Korea’s founding. In September 2007, Representative Jung Gap-yoon of the 
conservative Hannara Party formalized Lee’s suggestion by motioning a bill that proposed 
changing National Liberation Day to National Foundation Day. On May 22, 2008, the 
freshly-inaugurated Lee Myung-back government launched a Committee for the 60th 
Anniversary of the Republic of Korea in line with Jung’s initiative. The Committee was 
mandated with the task of leading and organizing events in celebration of the country’s 
sixtieth birthday. The bill and the creation of the Committee, however, amounted to little.  
 On August 7, 2008, the Committee for Korean Provisional Government, along 
with over fifty other organizations, filed a constitutional petition, claiming that recognizing 
1948 as the country’s founding year violates the Constitution. It contended that because the 
Constitution’s Preamble makes a specific reference to the establishment of the Provisional 
Republic of Korea Government in 1919 as a significant moment in South Korea’s two 
thousand year history that represents the spirit of democracy and national aspirations for a 
peaceful unification, it is wrong to claim that 1948 is South Korea’s founding year.3 On 
August 12, the members of the Association for Korean Modern and Contemporary History 
and fourteen other history-related organizations signed a petition denouncing the creation 
                                          
3 The Preamble reads, “We, the people of Korea, proud of a resplendent history and traditions dating from 
time immemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional Republic of Korea Government born of the March 
First Independence Movement of 1919 and the democratic ideals of the April Nineteenth Uprising of 1960 
against injustice, having assumed the mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our 
homeland and having determined to consolidate national unity with justice….the Constitution, ordained 
and established on the Twelfth Day of July anno Domini Nineteen hundred and forty-eight, and amended 
eight times subsequently. Oct. 29, 1987.” For a full translation of the South Korean Constitution see: 
http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng?pstSeq=54794.  
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of the National Foundation Day. On August 14, the Association for the Families of Fighters 
for National Independence demanded an immediate stop to all activities pertaining to the 
celebration of the country’s 60th anniversary. Amid vociferous opposition, Representative 
Jung withdrew the bill, bringing the controversy to a temporary halt. On March 1, 2018, 
on the occasion of March First Independence Movement, President Moon Jae-in publicly 
announced that 2019 would mark the centennial anniversary of the country’s founding. The 
decision received overwhelming support of the South Korean people.4  
 This essay investigates the question of founding in contemporary South Korea. I 
argue that given the overwhelming popular support for 1919 as South Korea’s founding, 
the South Korean conception of founding is best understood as being cultural and historical 
in nature. In the absence of a strong link between constitutionalism and democratic 
foundation and a clear notion of individual rights, the South Korean case sits outside the 
scope of the existing theories on founding. While the anti-foundationalist perspective that 
challenges the importance of constitutional forms may help make sense of the South 
Korean situation, its rights-based approach—deriving from the notion of individual rights 
and the perception of individuals as autonomous, equal rights-holders—poses problems in 
the South Korean context because an atomistic ontology of self does not exist in the 
                                          
4 In a 2015 public opinion poll taken by a South Korean polling company, Realmeter, 63.9% of the 500 
people polled identified 1919 as the country’s founding while only 21.0% answered 1948. See Hyun-san 
Yoo, “6 out of 10 South Koreans citizens say founding year is 1919,” CBS No Cut News, August, 21, 2015. 
http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/4461631. In a similar poll conducted by JoWon C&I in 2018, the result 
remained largely unchanged: 62% of the respondents said 1919 whereas only 27.2% stated 1948.4 See 
Dae-chan Moon, “62% says foundation coincides with the establishment of the Korean Provisional 
Government,” Kuki News, March 6, 2018. http://www.kukinews.com/news/article.html?no=529584. 
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traditional Korean culture; self is first and foremost a relational concept, rather than 
absolute. Despite South Korea’s democratization and the adoption of the language of 
constitutionalism, rights, and equality, the prevailing notion of peoplehood in South Korea 
is cultural, originating from ethnic homogeneity that has existed and remained unchanged 
for thousands of years. In light of this historically-generated conception of the people, the 
introduction of the notion of “We the People” as an assembly of individual constitutional 
agents in 1948 attract little support when questions that concern national identity and 
legitimacy such as South Korea’s founding are raised.  
 The essay will proceed as follows. I begin by articulating the problem of founding 
as presented in contemporary democratic theory and discussing the existing literature on 
the topic. Then, I discuss the events of 1919 and 1948 in turn with a view to bringing to 
light the specific aspects of the events that play an important part in the shaping of South 
Korean approach to founding. The last section attempts to draw out theoretical implications 
of the 1919 vs. 1948 debate and define the meaning of founding in the South Korean 
context. 
 
Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of Founding 
 In On Revolution, Hannah Arendt raised the problem of founding in the modern 
era. The principal issue, she claims, is the “constant, ever-widening and –deepening crisis 
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of authority”5—that is, the fact that “authority has vanished from the modern world.”6 For 
much of the Western world history, authority was thought to have stemmed from a kind of 
“higher being”—the “absolute” as she called it—that bestowed “legality and legitimacy 
upon positive, posited laws” and “legitimacy upon the powers that be.”7 But with the onset 
of secularization and the fall of absolute monarchy, authority lost its basis and, as a result, 
the world came to exist without authority. Recreating the absolute and “grappling with the 
perplexities of beginning” became the chief task of all revolutionaries.8  
 Between the French Revolution and the American Revolution, only the latter, 
Arendt argues, succeeded in identifying a new and viable source of authority. The French 
tried to locate the absolute in the nation, more precisely the general will of the people, but 
failed miserably due to its tendency to change like “quicksand” and relentlessly produced 
new laws—such as ordinances and decrees—that became obsolete the moment they were 
issued.9 The Americans, on the other hand, succeeded because they turned to the “political 
wisdom of antiquity,” specifically that of Rome.10 Using the Latin concept of law (lex, 
meaning an intimate connection or relationship), religion (religio coming from the verb 
religare which means to bind) and authority (autoritas coming from the verb augure which 
means to augment and increase), they found the source of authority in the tradition of 
                                          
5 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Penguin Books, 
1961), 91. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 151-152. 
8 Ibid., 199. 
9 Ibid.,, 154-156, 175. 
10 Ibid., 199.  
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“handing down, through an unbroken line of successors, of the principle established in the 
beginning”—put another way, in the display of unconditional deference to the constitution 
representing the nation’s founding.11 She wrote:  
 
What saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its own 
principle within itself, or, to be more precise, that beginning and principle, 
principium and principle, are not only related to each other, but are coeval. The 
absolute from which the beginning is to derive its own validity and which must 
save it, as it were, from its inherent arbitrariness is the principle which, together 
with it, makes its appearance in the world.12 
 
In this way, the new American republic succeeded where all others failed: to found a new 
body politic stable enough to last for generations to come.13 
 Yet Arendt’s celebration of the American Revolution and its achievements hardly 
precluded further discussion on the problem of founding. In recent years, the topic has 
taken a normative turn, regaining prominence as “the paradox of founding” that has been 
subject to intense scrutiny by political theorists interested in the problems of authority and 
legitimacy associated with foundings in contemporary democracies. At the heart of the 
                                          
11 Ibid., 192-193.  
12 Ibid., 205.  
13 Ibid., 190-191.  
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debate are the following questions. First, it has come to the attention of many that the 
common presupposition that there exists a well-defined, fixed body of people who gives 
life to the phrase “We the People” is in fact questionable. Who are the people who claim 
to be the “We” and how does the act of self-constitution come about prior to the 
constitution-making? Second, what gives “the people” the authority to found? The advent 
of modernity does away with the notion that there are lawgivers whose superior wisdom 
and impartiality authorize them to create laws from ex nihilo; clearly, Plato’s philosopher 
king or Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s mysterious and foreign legislator are not viable options 
in a constitutional democracy. Third, if the answer to the second question is the constitution, 
then we find ourselves in an inextricable bind: what comes first, the people or the 
constitution? If “the people” are the defining feature of constitutional democracy and are 
the author of the constitution, then it seems that “the people” are, as Angélica Maria Bernal 
has put it aptly, both “the cause and effect of its own constitutional founding”—the so-
called, “the paradox of founding.”14  
 One approach to addressing this problem has been to reconcile popular sovereignty 
and constitutionalism—a strategy that is best represented in Bruce Ackerman’s classic 
work, We the People: Foundations. Here, Ackerman attempts to bring popular sovereignty 
and constitutionalism together by interpreting the American constitutional democracy as a 
“dualist democracy” in which there are two different decisions being made—a decision by 
                                          
14 Angélica M. Bernal, Beyond Origins: Rethinking Founding in a Time of Constitutional Democracy 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 7. 
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the American people, which occurs rarely and only under special circumstances, and a 
decision by their government, which occurs regularly in relation to managing the day-to-
day operations of the government.15 In times of “ordinary politics,” the political leaders 
work through existing institutions, norms, and practices to reach decisions. But when there 
are exceptional events, constitutional politics takes precedence over ordinary politics and 
compels the democratic citizenry to participate in the decision-making process. In this light, 
founding was spearheaded by the revolutionaries but is still democratically legitimate due 
to the process of popular consensus through which the would-be founders gained the right 
to speak and act in the name of the people. 
 A second approach involves understanding the constitution as an on-going, open-
ended project that is amenable to correction, reinterpretation, and expansion. Its best known 
advocates are Jürgen Habermas and William Rehg. In their co-authored article, 
“Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?”, Habermas 
and Regh argue that a “democratic” constitution is a tradition-building project with a clear 
starting point and one that gains legitimacy with the passage of time.16 They write: 
 
[t]he allegedly paradoxical relation between democracy and the rule of law 
resolves itself in the dimension of historical time, provided one conceives the 
                                          
15 Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1991), 6-7. 
16 Ibid., 774. 
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constitution as a project that makes the founding act into an ongoing process of 
constitution-making that continues across generations.17 
 
What they propose is a “dynamic understanding of the constitution” which involves 
holding the later generations responsible for actualizing the “still-untapped normative 
substance of the system of rights” provided in the original constitution.18 In their view, 
constitution-making should be understood as a long-term “self-correcting learning 
process.”19  
 A third approach draws on an agonistic understanding of political life in general, 
providing an anti-foundationalist vision of founding that diverges from the previous two. 
A leading proponent of this view is Jason Frank who suggests that “the preoccupation with 
‘founding’ should perhaps be supplemented by the ongoing and enacted pursuit of a 
‘finding,’ a search after our answerability to the claims made by others upon us and by us 
upon them.”20 He argues that instead of one defining founding moment, history repeatedly 
demonstrates—through public protests, marches, sit-ins, and candlelight vigils—a struggle 
over what Hannah Arendt called “the right to have rights”21: that is, “the right to be a 
                                          
17 Jürgen Habermas and William Rehg, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?,” Political Theory 29, no. 6 (2001): 768.  
18 Ibid., 774. 
19 Ibid., 774.  
20 Jason Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 253. 
21 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968). See 
Chapter 9, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man” and specifically, the 
section, “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man,” 290-302.  
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political being, to make claims not through appeal to an existing juridical authority but 
through the popular enactment and protection of rights themselves.”22 These struggles 
form what he calls “constituent moments” that open up a new and unclaimed political space 
and serve as a witness to the creation and recreation of “We the People” in varied instances 
of democratic claims making.23  
 None of the three perspectives, however, are able to fully account for the South 
Korean approach to founding. The principal reason is that they all make their case based 
on the notion of individual rights—whether in a naturally endowed form or in the shape of 
popular enactment—and the perception of individual as an abstract, independent being. 
The purpose of their discussion is, therefore, to ruminate over how to best protect these 
rights and, more specifically, whether a constitutional form is enough. In the case of South 
Korea, however, rights is simply not the issue at stake. Rather, it is past historical 
experiences and the question of national identity that drive the debate. In the next section, 
I discuss the events of 1919 and 1948 and their respective significance in South Korean 
political history.  
 
The 1919 vs. 1948 Debate 
1919 
 There are two main events that are typically associated with 1919: the March First 
                                          
22 Frank, Constituent Moments, 147.  
23 Ibid., 253. 
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Independence Movement and the creation of the Korean Provisional Government on April 
11th. The advocates of 1919 as the country’s founding year unanimously point to the 
Preamble of the South Korean Constitution which makes specific reference to both events 
as a defining moment in South Korea’s history that embody the nation’s aspirations for 
independence and self-determination.24 Indeed the historical significance of the events of 
1919 is tremendous in the modern South Korean history for the two following reasons. 
 First, the March First Independence Movement symbolizes Korea’s resistance 
against the injustice of the Japanese colonial occupation and national aspirations for 
Korea’s independence. Here, I provide a short history lesson in order to demonstrate the 
significance of Japanese colonization in South Korean history. Japan occupied Korea from 
1910 to 1945 as part of its expansionist foreign policy that began in the late 1800s and later 
developed into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere project. Japan’s annexation of 
Korea came in three stages. In 1905, Korea was made a protectorate of Japan under the 
Korea-Japan Treaty, also known as Eulsa Treaty, which deprived Korea of its diplomatic 
sovereignty. In 1907, Korea lost its right to administer internal affairs to Japan as the 
provisions of Korea-Japan Treaty of 1907 stipulated that the authority to make decisions 
concerning Korea’s internal affairs—such as appointing and dismissing high-ranking 
                                          
24 As already mentioned in Footnote 3, supra, the Preamble reads, “We, the people of Korea, proud of a 
resplendent history and traditions dating from time immemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional 
Republic of Korea Government born of the March First Independence Movement of 1919…..For a full 
translation of the South Korean Constitution see: 
http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng?pstSeq=54794. 
 
 
18 
officials—rested with the Japanese Resident-General stationed in Korea. In 1910, the 
signing of the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty formally enabled the Japanese Empire to 
engulf Korea. 
 The Japanese colonial occupation of Korea is typically characterized as having 
three phases: the initial military rule from 1910 to 1919, the “cultural rule” from 1919 to 
early 1930s, and the final militarist-fascist rule. In the initial period, Japan ruled Korea 
through the military, ruthlessly crushing dissent and banning newspapers.25 Following the 
March First Independence Movement in 1919, it took a milder approach, granting more 
latitude in the freedom of expression—for example, allowing intellectuals to explore 
Western ideas and literary forms.26 The final period saw the Japanese colonial rule in its 
most intense form as Japan embarked on the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) 
against China and the quest to conquer all of Asia gained force.27 On Japan’s policy of full 
wartime mobilization, Andrea Matles Savada and Williams Shaw, researchers with the 
Library of Congress, wrote: 
 
                                          
25 One of the first things the Japanese did was to ban newspapers and the press. By 1912, over 50,000 
arrests had been made on the grounds of illegal political activities. See George Katsiaficas, South Korean 
Social Movements in the 20th Century. Asia's Unknown Uprisings; v. 1. (Oakland, Calif.: PM Press, 2012), 
42. 
26 Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw. South Korea a Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 22-23. While all literary outlets were subject to Japanese 
censorship, some magazines were still in circulation. A prime example is Kaebyok that served as a vehicle 
for spreading important social and intellectual ideas that could facilitate Korea’s cultural and 
socioeconomic development. See Oh, Korean Politics, 21-22.  
27 Ibid.  
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Not only was the economy reorganized onto a war footing, but the Koreans were 
to be totally assimilated as Japanese. The government also began to enlist Korean 
youths in the Japanese army as volunteers in 1938 and as conscripts in 1943. 
Worship at Shinto shrines became mandatory, and every attempt at preserving 
Korean identity was discouraged.28 
 
Indeed, Korea became more than a war supply base for Japan’s growing empire; it was, 
according to Jeon Sang-sook, a political science professor at Yonsei University, “a strategic 
pillar for the Japanese enterprise for regional dominance and territorial expansion” and was 
widely considered “crucial” to guarantee the success of Japan’s imperialist goals.29 By the 
end of Japan’s thirty-five year rule, Koreans had been completely stripped of their national 
identity and culture. 
 In light of such brutal colonial experience, the March First Independence 
Movement carries enormous significance in Korean history because it was the first 
nationwide organized public display of resistance against Japan.30 Led by a group of thirty-
three independence activists, it began with a solemn proclamation of the Declaration of 
Independence—which had been drafted by historian Choe Nam-seon,31 who was one of 
                                          
28 Savada and William. South Korea a Country Study, 21.  
29 Jeon Sang-sook, “The Characteristics of Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea,” The Journal of Northeast 
Asian History 8, no. 1 (Summer 2011), 40. 
30 This is not to say that there were no resistance activities preceding the event. According to Katsiaficas, 
the number of armed confrontations against Japan between 1907 and 1911 is recorded at 143,690. (Source: 
Governor General of Korea) See Katsiaficas, South Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century, 41. 
31 Choe Nam-seon (1890-1957) was a prominent historian who was also an independence activist.  
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the thirty-three men, prior to the event—at 14:00 at Taehwagwan Restaurant32 in Insa-
dong, Jong-no district in Seoul. It read: 
 
We hereby declare that Korea is an independent state and that Koreans are a self-
governing people. We proclaim it to the nations of the world in affirmation of the 
principle of the equality of all nations, and we proclaim it to our posterity, 
preserving in perpetuity the right of national survival. We make this declaration on 
the strength of five thousand years of history as an expression of the devotion and 
loyalty of twenty million people. We claim independence in the interest of the 
eternal and free development of our people and in accordance with the great 
movement for world reform based upon the awakening conscience of mankind. 
This is the clear command from heaven, the course of our times, and a legitimate 
manifestation of the right of all nations to coexist and live in harmony. Nothing in 
the world can suppress or block it.33 
 
                                          
32 The original location was the Tapgol Park in downtown Seoul. But due to fear that the location would be 
compromised before the event and that the crowd might become unruly, the venue was changed to a more 
private location.  
33 Declaration of Independence (March 1st, 1919) See: 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/korea/march_first_declaration.pdf. In closing, the thirty-three men made 
three open pledges to convey the sincerity and seriousness of their intent: first, that their actions represent 
the Korean people’s demand for justice, humanity, survival, and dignity; second; that they will not hesitate 
to exercise their right to publicize the views of the Korean people; and lastly, that they will use non-violent 
means to achieve their goal. Upon completing their planned actions, they informed the police, sent a copy 
of the declaration to the Japanese resident-general and surrendered themselves for arrest to publicly display 
their commitment to the principle of non-violence.  
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Inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points34 introduced at the Paris Peace Conference 
in January 1919, only two months before the event, the declaration embodied the liberal 
democratic principles of freedom, equality, and national self-determination and the right to 
self-rule that Koreans had long been deprived of and aspired to regain.  
 Outside Taehwagwan, a network of activists worked meticulously to ensure the 
movement’s widest impact. In Pagoda Park located at the heart of Seoul, a young student 
named Jung Jae-yong read the Declaration out loud before an immense crowd. In other 
places, special delegates arrived with a copy of the declaration in hand and delivered it in 
public squares so that the people there too could hear the message. As a result, 
demonstrations erupted not only in Seoul but everywhere—including the cities of Wonsan, 
Pyongyang, Jinnampo, Anju, Jinju, Euiju, and Sunchon—all at the same time.35 Out of a 
total population of sixteen million, over one million people were mobilized that day across 
the country, which makes the event one of the largest nationalist movements in Korean 
history.36 
 Second, the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) 
represented the notion of self-determination and self-rule of the Korean people for the first 
time in Korean history. Initially based in Shanghai, China, the KPG took its shape and came 
into existence shortly after the March First Independence Movement although rumors of 
                                          
34President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points (1918) See: 
www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=62. 
35 Katsiaficas, South Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century, 43. 
36 Ibid. 
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its creation and blueprint had been in circulation for quite some time.37 Contrary to the 
common belief that the KPG was, as its name suggests, merely a “provisional” government 
without any legal grounding or actual substance, it was formed via a democratic process. 
On April 13, 1919, over 1,000 independence activists arrived in Shanghai to elect 33 
members of the legislature who would represent the Korean people residing in the thirteen 
provinces located in Korea as well in Russia, United States, and China.38 Accordingly, the 
KPG was founded on a constitution that identified the March First Independence 
Movement as its spiritual origin and envisioned a “republican government”39 that upholds 
the democratic ideals of freedom and equality. Its beginning reads: 
  
By the will of God, the people of Korea, both within and without the country, have 
united in peaceful demonstration of their independence and for over one month 
have carried on their demonstrations in over three hundred districts, and because 
their faith in the movement they have, by their representatives, chosen a 
provisional government to carry on to completion this independence and so to 
preserve blessings for our children and grandchildren. The Provisional 
Government in its council of state have decided on a provisional constitution, 
                                          
37 The blueprint was featured in underground newspapers around the time of the March First Movement.  
38 Nam Mun-hee, “Aprll 13th is the founding day,” Sisanin, April 25, 2016. 
http://www.sisain.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=25891.  
39 The KPG established three branches of government: legislative, administrative, and judicial. Syngman 
Rhee was its first president.  
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which it now proclaims:  
 
1. The Korean Republic shall follow republican principles. 
2. All powers of state shall rest with the provisional council of state and the 
provisional government.  
3. There shall be no class distinction among the citizens of the Korean Republic, 
but men and women, noble and common, rich and poor, will have equality…..40 
  
 The KPG operated as a de facto government for the Korean people under which 
all resistance groups, both at home and abroad, united and worked together to resist Japan 
and achieve independence. Its activities included sending delegations to international 
conferences to solicit moral support for its cause, providing aid to independence fighters, 
and producing the influential newspaper, The Independent, to raise national consciousness 
and promote political participation. To be sure, the KPG was not without problems and it 
is unclear just how much the ordinary Korean people knew of their plans and activities and 
were impacted by them. 41  Furthermore, the KPG did not have formal international 
recognition—a point supporters of 1948 as South Korea’s founding year consistently raise 
                                          
40 For a full text of the Constitution of the Provisional Government of 1919 see: 
http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/fullbrowser/collection/p15799coll126/id/22238/rv/singleitem 
41 As Japan tightened its grip during the final phase of its occupation and viciously suppressed all 
nationalist activities, the KPG began to split among those operating in Russia, China, and the U.S. In the 
later period, there were multiple provisional governments each claiming to be the legitimate authority. But 
the KPG I mention here is the one formed in 1919 and based in Shanghai—which is generally considered 
the first self-governing democratic body in Korean history.  
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to challenge the legitimacy of KPG.42 But what is clear is that it was the first time in 
Korean history that an independent, self-governing body based on republican ideals was 
established by Koreans through a process that they had planned and organized. The KPG, 
even with its shortcomings, helped Koreans regain their sense of national identity and 
exercise sovereignty—even if limited—that they had been deprived of for decades since 
Japan took over the Korean peninsula.  
 
1948  
 By all accounts, 1948 was a critical year in South Korean history. After all, all the 
important milestones in the country’s journey towards democracy were reached in 1948: 
first, the creation of the National Assembly on May 10th through a UN-sponsored general 
election; second, the adoption of the constitution on July 12th and its promulgation five 
days later; third, the proclamation of the government of South Korea on August 15th; and 
lastly, the formal recognition of the newly created South Korean government as the sole 
legitimate governing body on the Korean peninsula by the United Nations General 
Assembly in December. Yet to take these events at face-value would be to entirely amiss 
the way South Koreans understand them in relation to the country’s democratic founding. 
Indeed there are three important reasons why the majority of the South Korean population 
                                          
42 This is controversial. Some claim that the KPG in fact did gain recognition from a number of foreign 
governments (mostly those who were also in exile such as the Nationalist Government of China) whereas 
others claim that recognition under international law need not be legal. But the prevailing view in South 
Korea is that international recognition is not needed for the government to claim legitimacy.  
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do not associate 1948 with the country’s democratic founding. 
 First, the events of 1948 were neither driven nor motivated by South Koreans 
themselves. South Korea became independent from Japan not by way of revolution but by 
liberation by the Allied Forces. Arendt once argued in On Revolution that revolution and 
liberation are not the same; the former leads to freedom whereas liberation does not—at 
best, it leads to nothing more than a release from bondage.43 South Korea was precisely 
the case of liberation that Arendt described. And because South Korea did not win its 
freedom with its own hands and was quickly occupied by the Allied Forces as soon as the 
Japanese troops withdrew, the nation-making process was far from being an independent, 
self-directed process. To begin, democracy was introduced in South Korea not by choice 
but by circumstances. The following remark by Byung-kook Kim, a renowned professor 
of political science at Korea University, captures best the situation surrounding South 
Korea’s turn towards democracy in the early days of the Cold War: 
 
A product of U.S foreign policy and a child of conflict with communism, South 
Korea embraced democracy as its state ideology not because of a belief in its 
intrinsic superiority but because of an acute sense of military insecurity and 
political vulnerability. There could be no other alternative. An explicit negation of 
democracy as its state ideology would have left South Korea with neither a 
                                          
43 Arendt, On Revolution, 1.  
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national identity different from North Korea’s nor a foreign patron. The ruling 
elites of South Korea thus embraced democracy mainly on pragmatic or 
functionalist grounds, as an instrument for national survival.44 
 
The fact that the constitution was drafted and adopted within such a short period of time—
only two months—was no mere coincidence: the United States Congress had made a 
massive defense budget cut shortly after WWII, precipitating an early termination of 
American military presence on the Korean peninsula and a transfer of power to the 
Koreans.45 To expedite the adoption of constitution, the American military government 
created an interim government which, in turn, appointed the initial constitution-drafting 
subcommittee.46 The whole nation-building program was, in other words, shaped and 
directed by the Americans.  
 Second, despite the adoption of a constitution, South Korea’s inaugural 
government of Syngman Rhee did not establish a tradition of democracy—if anything, it 
introduced and helped institutionalize authoritarianism. Again, a short history lesson is in 
needed here in order to facilitate a fuller understanding of the legacy of Rhee’s presidency. 
                                          
44 Byung-Kook Kim, “Party Politics in South Korea’s Democracy: The Crisis of Success,” in Larry J. 
Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim. Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000), 70-71.  
45 John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 26. The general election (through which the members of the 
National Assembly were selected) occurred on May 10th and the constitution was adopted on July 12th—
which indicates that the lawmakers had only two months to draft the constitution.  
46 Ibid.  
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The South Korean government at its birth was a “mixed government,” a blend of the 
presidential system and parliamentary system, that was adopted, not on the basis of any 
theory or the experience of its superior form, but as a result of a political compromise 
between Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s would-be first president and a firm advocate of the 
presidential system, and the Korea Democratic Party (KDP), which backed the 
parliamentary system due to its majority position in the National Assembly. Rhee rejected 
parliamentarianism, arguing that it would lead to factionalism and deprive the people of 
their right to exercise popular sovereignty. The KDP, on the other hand, contended that a 
presidential system would give too much power to a single individual and that the 
parliamentarian system was a better option for maintaining a balance of power among the 
different branches of government. In the end, the two sides settled on a government with 
the following features: first, the president serves as the head of the government; second, 
the National Assembly elects the president in an indirect election; third, the executive 
power is shared between the president and the cabinet.47  
 The mixed government, however, had a short life—lasting only about four years 
in effect. One reason for this was that, being subject to a near constant embattlement 
between the president and the National Assembly, it was unable to maintain a stable and 
functioning government. But the main reason was that its legitimacy was profoundly 
compromised by the very people who had created it. Rhee amended the constitution twice 
                                          
47 Myung-Lim Park, "Original Peculiarities of Constitution and Democracy in South Korea." Korea 
Observer 41, no. 2 (2010): 226. 
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during his twelve-year presidency and in both times, the motive for amendment had little 
to do with protecting the rights of the people or expanding public interest. Instead, it had 
everything to do with extending his presidential term and scope of power.48  
 The first revision of the constitution came on July 7, 1952. Under the pretext of 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Rhee pushed through a bill that changed the 
selection process for president from an indirect election to a direct popular vote, knowing 
that he had a slim chance of being re-elected by the National Assembly where he had little 
support. Outside the parliament, however, Rhee was revered by the majority of the 
population—who were barely surviving the war and knew little of his true intention—as 
the “father of the nation” and enjoyed immense popularity which would guarantee his re-
election.49 In order to secure votes in his favor, Rhee ordered the police and army troops 
to seal off the National Assembly for two days. 50  The second revision occurred on 
November 29, 1954—only sixteen months after the first amendment. The change lifted the 
two-term limit on the presidency, allowing Rhee to run for president for a third term in 
May 1956. Rhee was elected for the fourth time in March 1960 but, amid violent student 
                                          
48 Rhee was president from 1948-1960.  
49 John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 39. 
50 Park, “Original Peculiarities of Constitution and Democracy in South Korea,” 229. Park noted that all 
163 assembly members in attendance voted in favor of the new draft Constitution; there were no votes 
against it. Another important point is that Rhee, who had been a harsh critic of political parties during 
constitution-making, later formed his own Liberal Party in order to muster support in the National 
Assembly. While the creation of the Liberal Party was still not enough to earn him the required number of 
votes to win the indirect election, it demonstrates that Rhee’s criticism of party politics was not genuine and 
politically motivated.  
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demonstrations, resigned six days later.  
 According to Myung-Lim Park, a political science professor at Korea University, 
the first constitutional revision essentially turned the mixed government into a 
plebiscitarian democracy that Rhee used to suppress and bypass formal institutional 
arrangements and methods such as legislature, elections, party politics by forging a direct 
relation between the state and the people: “[r]esorting to a revision of the Constitution, the 
repeated circumvention of the legislature, and a mobilization of the people,” Park wrote, 
“are all typical features of plebiscitarian democracy.”51 With a plebiscitarian government 
in operation, Park argues, the role of the legislature and political parties gradually 
diminished, leaving power solely in the hands of the president.52 Indeed Rhee exercised 
dictatorial power and tolerated little opposition to his policies, steering the country in the 
direction away from democracy. Furthermore, he set a dangerous precedent of 
manipulating the constitution to create conditions in his favor or suspending it when things 
got in his way—a practice his successors, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, did not 
hesitate to reprise for their own political gains.53 Between 1948 and 1987, the constitution 
underwent nine revisions—an average of one amendment every four to five years.54 In the 
                                          
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid., 230.  
53 Ibid. 
54  The First Republic alone witnessed two constitutional changes. The third revision introduced a 
parliamentary cabinet system and established the Second Republic (1960-1961). However, it lasted only for 
nine months and was overthrown in a coup d’état led by Park Chung-hee. When Park seized power in May 
1961, he declared martial law and ruled through the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of which 
he was the head. The Third Republic (1963-72) returned to the presidential system with Park as president in 
1963. Park was reelected to his second term in May 1967. In October 1969, the National Assembly revised 
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view of many, the Rhee government simply does not symbolize the beginning of 
democracy but that of authoritarianism that would engulf South Korea for the next forty 
years. 
 Third, constitutionalism and the notion of the rule of law carried little meaning in 
post-war Korea. It goes without saying that Rhee’s authoritarian and arbitrary rule made 
abundantly clear to everyone that laws and institutions cannot or are not enough to curb 
political ambitions and guarantee a democratic process. But more importantly, Koreans do 
not trust the law as a source of justice and equality for reasons that have much to do with 
traditional Korean culture and customs as well as history.  
 When the Yi family founded the Chosun Dynasty in 1392, its first king, Taejo, 
formally introduced Confucianism as the official state ideology. As the nation’s principal 
belief system, Confucianism dictated every aspect of Korean life—providing guidelines 
for government administrations as well as shaping the social norms, values, ideals and 
practices.55 It also imposed a deeply hierarchical political and social system, dividing the 
population into three main groups: the royal family, yangban (the noble people who were 
                                          
the constitution so that Park could run for election for the third time. In December 1971, shortly after 
beginning his third term, Park declared a national emergency—on the grounds of national security—and, in 
October 1972, suspended the constitution and dissolved the legislature. Soon after, Park announced the 
launch of the Fourth Republic (1972-1980) based on the newly drafted Yushin Constitution that would allow 
him to serve a six-year term with no restrictions on reelection. In 1980, Chun Doo-hwan changed the 
constitution for the eighth time to allow himself to serve a single seven year term and to launch the Fifth 
Republic (1980-1987). The final constitution amendment occurred in 1987. It introduced the Sixth Republic 
and is the most enduring constitution to date.  
55 Chan Jin Kim, “Korean Attitudes Towards Law.” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 10, no. 1 
(December, 2000): 4-5.  
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eligible to sit for the national civil servant examination), pyeongmin (ordinary folks such 
as farmers and traders) and cheonmin (slaves who could be bought and sold).56 Using this 
caste system as the basis of its application, the legal system subjected each group to a 
different set of laws. For those in the lower caste, the laws were harsh, often serving as a 
vehicle for chastisement and punishment.57 But for those in the ruling caste, the laws were 
much more forgiving, allowing them to do things that average folks would not be able to 
do without consequences. This unequal treatment based on caste endured for over five 
hundred years. By the time the Chosun Dynasty came to an end in 1910, inequality before 
the law had become a standard practice in the traditional Korean society.  
 Under the Japanese occupation, the situation grew only worse. The Japanese 
introduced Western law, much of which derived from the German civil law system, and 
established courts in which yangban and commoners were treated equal.58 But this hardly 
mattered since law in the context of colonial rule served merely as an instrument of 
subjugation and exploitation. The Japanese legal code prescribed separate laws for the 
Japanese and the Koreans, making Koreans second-class citizens. Indeed it quickly became 
a symbol of oppression as it forced Koreans to embrace Japanese culture and customs 
against their will; for instance, requiring all Koreans to adopt a Japanese name or speak 
only in Japanese, or banning men’s traditional hairstyle—the topknot.59  In this light, 
                                          
56 Ibid., 6.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Katsiaficas, South Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century, 39.  
59 Ibid.  
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breaking the law came to be seen as an expression of resistance toward the Japanese 
occupation and an act of patriotism that involved a great degree of personal sacrifice and 
risk-taking. Chan Jin Kim, a legal scholar and practitioner as well as former member of the 
National Assembly, explained: 
 
During this period, law came to be seen as the antithesis of equality, justice, and 
inalienable rights. Likewise, patriotism coincided with having the courage to 
commit treason or to show disrespect towards the colonial rulers. Breaking the law 
was regarded as a means for the people to express their discontent with colonial 
rule.60 
 
Law and justice in the traditional Korean society, in other words, did not go hand in hand—
to the contrary, they opposed each other.  
 In his influential study of the Korean political tradition and the law, Dr. Hahm 
Pyong-choon, one of South Korea’s most prominent legal scholars, argued that South 
Korea’s traditional culture and history conflicted with the Western notion of the rule of law 
and justice that originate in the abstract notions of freedom, equality, and fairness.61 
Because the application of law in the Korean society has always been partial to one’s status 
in society, the prevailing belief is that justice involves taking into account one’s 
                                          
60 Ibid., 7.  
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circumstances and amending unequal relationships. The rule of law, on the other hand, 
assumes equality in standing—or what Alexis de Tocqueville called “equality of 
condition”62—and universal application of the law regardless of circumstances. Such 
condition, however, is difficult to relate to from the Korean perspective. In the Korean 
frame of mind, the constitution and the rule of law are merely a means for the powerful to 
get what they want. As Prof. Jeong-Ho Roh noted in his study of constitutional democracy 
in Korea, the “pervasive detachment of the constitution in the minds of the people as the 
supreme law of the land and the difficulty of socializing the rule of law concept and 
constitutionalism” posed a major challenge to South Korea’s democratization.63 
 
Theoretical Implications of the 1945 vs. 1919 Debate and the South Korean 
Understanding of Founding  
 The 1945 vs. 1919 debate and the overwhelming popular support for 1919 as South 
Korea’s founding direct us to the following important implications about the perception of 
founding in contemporary South Korea.  
 First, constitution-making and the constitution, from the South Korean perspective, 
have little connection to freedom. In the Western tradition, the conventional wisdom is that 
                                          
62 Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out in Democracy in America that one of the most compelling aspects of 
the American society was the “equality of condition’ from which its democracy animated. He believed that 
it was what was responsible for the success of American democracy. See Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy 
in America. Translated, edited, and with an Introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).  
63 Jeong-Ho Roh, “Crafting and Consolidating Constitutional Democracy in Korea,” in Kim, Samuel. 
Korea’s Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 183. 
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the adoption of a constitution and the form of government emanating from it are what 
guarantee freedom. In America’s Constitutional Soul, the prominent political theorist 
Harvey Mansfield argued that constitutional democracy leads to a better, safer, and nobler 
democracy “because it has an order, or structure, or form.” 64  The “formalism” of 
constitutionalism is what brings about a true democracy in which the government secures 
the rights of all and citizens performs their duty to govern themselves. The reason that there 
are political ills, he argues, is that the people regard the constitution as a means to get what 
they want rather than as a “form of government.”65 Only by restoring institutionalism and 
respect for form can the political ills be eliminated—because “the basis of freedom in our 
nature,” he says, is “formality.”66 He wrote: 
 
 …liberalism in its origin was primarily a doctrine of political science. 
 Although liberalism was based on rights and interests, it was not primarily a 
 doctrine—as we often suppose today—asserting that men should have their 
 rights guaranteed and their interests satisfied. Liberalism was originally about self-
 government in which men attempt to exercise their rights and pursue interests—
 the forms of self-government—were…as important as the securing of rights and 
 interests because rights and interests had to be secured freely. So although 
                                          
64 Harvey C. Mansfield, America's Constitutional Soul. The Johns Hopkins Series in Constitutional 
Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), ix. 
65 Ibid., 178.  
66 Ibid., 151-152.  
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 liberalism began its reasoning from prepolitical rights and interests in a state of 
 nature, from that beginning it looked forward to the constitution of government 
 under which rights and interests would be exercised and pursued politically, in 
 constitutional channels. Liberalism was originally a doctrine of constitutionalism 
 discovered and set forth by political science.67  
 
In the case of South Korea, however, the constitution in its early days carried little force 
and hardly guaranteed the freedom of the South Korean people. Furthermore, there never 
was a “form” or “formalities” to speak of given the frequent constitutional amendments 
and changes to the government structure.  
 Second, given the overwhelming support for 1919 as South Korea’s founding year, 
founding, in the South Korean context, is best understood as doing and acting—whether in 
the shape of public protests, marches, or violent resistance—in the name of freedom and 
independence. What ties together the events of 1919—the March First Independence 
Movement and the achievement of the Korean Provisional Government—is the display of 
defiance, courage, will, and pride of the Korean people in the face of oppressive Japanese 
occupation. In this light, the anti-foundationalist approach that reduces the importance of 
constitutional forms and instead emphasizes popular actions lend support to the South 
Korean case. The shared assumption here is that law and morality are not inextricably 
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bound, contrary to the claims made by the foundationalists such as Mansfield and 
Ackerman that they are, and that the laws are not enough to guarantee freedom.  
 In Beyond Origins: Rethinking Founding in a Time of Constitutional Democracy, 
Angélica Maria Bernal presented a view of founding which favors “contestation over unity, 
incompleteness over consolidation, creative unsettlement over perpetual binding, and 
ongoing foundation building over singular beginnings.” 68  Building on Jason Frank’s 
concept of the “underauthorized” which he describes as the “imposters, radicals, self-
created entities” who “seize the mantle of authorization, changing the inherited rules of 
authorization in the process,” 69  she offered a framework of “underauthorized 
authorization”: that is, the “claims and political actions that challenge the unstable and 
incomplete authority of an existing political order from a precarious and insufficiently 
authoritative place within it.”70 
 The problem, however, is that the anti-foundationalist approach continues to 
operate within the framework of rights—even if it does not embrace rights as a moral 
entitlement and view them as being subject to claim. Both Bernal and Frank derive their 
action-oriented approach from Arendt who argued in The Human Condition that in order 
to achieve freedom, one has to actively and deliberately insert oneself into the world and 
appear in public by way of words and deeds. Her assertion follows from her previous 
                                          
68 Bernal, Beyond Origins, 2.  
69 Frank, Constituent Moments, 8. 
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discussion in The Origins of Totalitarianism on the “right to have rights”71—that is, “the 
right to be a political being, to make claims not through appeal to an existing juridical 
authority but through the popular enactment and protection of rights themselves.”72 As 
Lida Maxwell points out, this “right to have rights” is not “an inviolable possession”73 or 
an entitlement but realized through a positive contribution—that is, “helping to stage a 
common world where everyone can demand rights”74 or “building the kind of political 
world where everyone can be fearless equal rights-claimers.”75  
 But in the South Korean case, the March First Independence Movement and the 
achievement of the Korean Provisional Government are celebrated not because they were 
moments in which individual rights and liberties were enacted through action and speech 
but because they symbolize the reclaiming of national sovereignty, identity, culture and 
history—which brings us to the last point.  
 Third, the concept of “inalienable” individual rights—consider, for instance, 
reference to “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” in the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence—that must never be transgressed or an atomistic ontology of self—as an 
independent and autonomous being as represented in Western social contractarianism—
simply do not constitute the highest values in the Korean political culture. 76  In the 
                                          
71 See Footnote 21.   
72 See Footnote 22.  
73 Lida Maxwell, “…to Have…” in De Gooyer, Stephanie, Alastair Hunt, Lida Maxwell, and Samuel 
Moyn. The Right to Have Rights. (London; New York: Verso, 2018), 48. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 53.  
76 For the full text of US Declaration of Independence (1776) see: https://www.archives.gov/founding-
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traditional Korean society, individual identity is defined not in absolute, but in relational 
terms—as a son, a father, and a member of a township or the Korean race. Hence, the 
understanding of self as an abstract, sovereign being means little. Consider the following 
statement by Byung-kook Kim on the nature of self from the Korean perspective: 
 
 The individual lacked absolute sovereignty. He was a relational social being, 
 always placed in mutually interlocking and interpenetrating positions with 
 the others….The self was, in conclusion, constituted by specific positions and 
 roles that an individual occupied and played within the expandable concentric 
 circles of human relations… The inner core of identity was defined by blood 
 ties (hyolyon). The outer rim was national consciousness (minjok). The circles 
 lying in between blood ties and national consciousness were constituted by 
 school (hakyon) and regional (jiyon) ties.77  
 
Human existence, in other words, is “anthropocentric”—to further borrow from Kim’s 
characterization—and constantly shaped and reshaped by varying degrees of overlapping 
human relationships. Furthermore, because the Korean people have existed as an ethnically 
homogeneous body, as a “dan-il-minjok” Koreans like to call themselves, on the Korean 
                                          
docs/declaration-transcript. 
77 Byung-Kook Kim, “Party Politics in South Korea’s Democracy: The Crisis of Success,” in Larry J. 
Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim. Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000), 64-65.  
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peninsula for over five thousand years, the idea of shared blood and common heritage 
occupies a central place in the Korean political life.78  
 Seen from this light, it is understandable why South Koreans associate founding 
with the events of 1919 rather than those of 1948. The notion of “We the People” carries 
cultural and historical significance and readily eclipses the notion of the people as 
individual rights-holders that is both new and foreign. This is, of course, not to say that the 
concept of individual rights does not exist in contemporary South Korea; constitutionalism, 
democracy and rights have become an increasingly important part of everyday discourse. 
And to be clear, the 1919 KPG constitution also adopted the language of rights, equality 
and justice. Yet when it comes to addressing questions concerning the authority of the 
South Korean state, culture and history take precedence over all else. The moral foundation 
of South Korean democracy, in other words, resides in the “Koreanness” of the actors 
involved, not in their agency as an autonomous, rights-holders. In this sense, “We the 
people” is necessarily “We the Korean People.”  
 
Conclusion 
 Ultimately, the recent South Korean debate on founding implies an alternative 
conception of founding that does not center on the rights discourse that is the defining 
feature of democracy. The South Korean understanding of founding is first and foremost 
                                          
78 Ibid., 63. “Dan-il” means single and “minjok” means national consciousness. Put together, the two 
emphasize the Korean people’s ethnic homogeneity.  
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nationalist, driven by the notion of peoplehood that is culturally and historically charged 
and always relational—for instance, vis-à-vis the Japanese colonizers. What further attests 
to this nationalist approach is the fact that in addition to the events of 1919 and 1948, the 
debate was also shaped by other views such as those that identified October 3rd, known as 
Gaecheonjeol (개천절), which literally means the “Opening of Heaven” as the nation’s 
founding.79 Gaecheonjeol marks Korea’s legendary founding of the state of Gojoseon in 
2,333 B.C. with the birth of Tan-gun, Korea’s mythical and semi-god, first king who was 
the son of a god (hwanin, “환인”) and a mortal woman (oongneyo, “웅녀”).80 The argument 
is that while the day celebrates Korea’s mythical origin, it signifies the beginning of the 
Korean race and of Korea’s two thousand year history. Another line of argument that also 
emerged during the debate was that Korea’s founding is yet to occur since Korea exists 
only as a unified nation.81 For the supporters of this view, only a reunification of South 
Korea and North Korea would constitute a proper founding of the Korean state. Indeed, 
from the Western perspective, the South Korean debate on founding may be a lost cause, 
completely misunderstanding what a democratic founding. But then again, the idea of 
rights is not necessarily considered the most important value in the Korean frame of mind. 
                                          
79 Kwon Hyunk-si, “Celebrate founding on Gaecheonjeol and designate March First as the Day of the 
Declaration of Independence,” cnbcnews, September 13, 2016. 
http://m.cnbcnews.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=3305.  
80 Gojoseon literally means “old” Joseon or Chosun.  
81 Lee Jung-moo, “A true founding has yet to arrive,” Voice of People, August 20, 2017. 
http://www.vop.co.kr/A00001192457.html.  
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Preserving the Koreanness, on the other hand, has always been a source of pride and dignity.  
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Ethics of Han: Emotions and the Problem of Korean Comfort Women 
 
Introduction 
 On December 28, 2015, the Governments of Japan and South Korea made a 
surprise announcement concerning the issue of Korean “comfort women”—a euphemism 
for hundreds of thousands of women predominantly from Korea but also from China and 
Southeastern Asian countries who were forced to serve as sex slaves for the Imperial 
Japanese Army during WWII. 1  Appearing together in a joint press conference, the 
Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-
Se envisioned a roadmap for a “final and irreversible” resolution of this decades-old 
controversy through the implementation of the following measures: first, an issuance of a 
sincere apology from the Government of Japan for its wartime conduct relating to the 
experience of comfort women; second, a payment of 1 billion Japanese yen (approximately 
$8.9 million) by the Government of Japan to a foundation established by the Government 
of South Korea to provide support for the former comfort women; third, the effort of the 
South Korean Government to help remove sonyeosang 2 —seated “girl” statue 
commemorating the women forced into sexual slavery—in front of the Japanese Embassy 
                                          
1 Estimates vary but it is widely understood that there were between 150,000-200,000 women who were 
forced to serve as sex slaves in military “comfort stations” in the Japanese-occupied territories between 
1932 and 1945. About 80% of these women were from Korea. Others came from China, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia.  
2 Sonyo (“소녀”) literally means a young girl and sang means statue in Korean. 
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in Seoul; and fourth, a pledge on the part of both governments to avoid further discussion, 
including accusing or criticizing each other, on this issue in the international community, 
including at the United Nations.3  
 The expectation was that the settlement would help remove the key stumbling 
block in Seoul-Tokyo relations that had prevented the two countries from putting the past 
behind them and help foster a friendlier and more cooperative bilateral partnership in the 
face of growing security threats from China and North Korea. Yet two years have passed 
and the deal is barely surviving. Shortly after taking office in May, 2017, the South Korean 
President Moon Jae-in told the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that the 2015 accord 
represented something that the majority of the South Korean people “cannot emotionally 
accept.”4 He went on to suggest that the two sides “work together based on understanding 
of the emotions and reality of the people,” throwing doubts on the viability of the 
arrangement and raising speculation whether he would seek renegotiation over the issue.5 
In January, 2018, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa announced that South Korea would 
honor the bilateral agreement and not seek renegotiations. She nonetheless stressed that the 
issue was far from being resolved and that Japan must be committed to “keep making 
                                          
3 For full text of the announcement by the Foreign Ministers of Japan and South Korea at the Joint Press 
Conference on December 28, 2015 see WSJ Staff, “Full Text: Japan-South Korea Statement on ‘Comfort 
Women’ at https://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/12/28/full-text-japan-south-korea-statement-on-
comfort-women/.  
4 James Griffith, “South Korea’s new president rejects Japan ‘comfort women’ deal,” CNN, June 5, 2017. 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/11/asia/south-korea-japan-comfort-women/index.html.  
5 Ibid.   
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efforts to honor and restore the dignity of victims.”6  
 In this essay, I explore the relations among emotion, culture, public deliberation, 
moral judgment, and justice in Korea by analyzing the comfort women issue. In stark 
contrast to the long-standing Western tradition that emphasizes reason and logic, emotions 
often take the center stage when dealing with issues of justice and moral concerns in Korea: 
more specifically, an intense culture-bound sentiment called han.7 The centrality of han in 
the Korean context suggests an alternative paradigm of moral and political judgment that 
sits outside the rationalist framework and is free of the deeply entrenched assumptions 
about the primacy of reason over emotions. I argue that the reason that the case of Korean 
comfort women has proven to be so challenging is because of han: that is, the failure to 
understand that the han of these women does not emerge solely from their wartime 
experience but begins in their pre-war lives and continues even after the war. Their 
accumulated han does not allow them to accept anything less than what they have been 
demanding repeatedly over the years: an official apology from the Japanese Prime Minister 
and an acknowledgement of “legal” responsibility.  
 The Korean comfort women controversy offers insight into how the dominance of 
emotions shapes Korean political culture and leads to a kind of public deliberation that is 
                                          
6 Bryan Harris and Robyn Hardin, “South Korea will not renegotiate ‘comfort women’ deal with Japan,” 
Financial Times, January 9th, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/3e21906e-f50e-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00.  
7 Han is written 한 in Korean and 恨 in Chinese characters (pronounced hèn in Mandarin). In modern 
Chinese, han means hatred, animosity, or resentment. In classical Chinese, however, it refers to “regret” or 
“unavenged injustice” and is similar to the Korean concept of han. 
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unlike the one typically envisioned in a liberal democracy—that involving reasoned and 
logical arguments. Emerging from this affective moral paradigm is a moral standpoint and 
impartiality that is determined, not by the force of reason and logic, but by victimhood. 
Indeed justice, in the Korean context is deeply cultural and historical and, more than 
anything else, is about alleviating the han of the victims and restoring their human dignity.  
 The essay proceeds as follows. In the first section, I explain the concept of Han. 
In the second section, I describe the key aspects of Korean culture that place emotions at 
the heart of moral and political debates. In the third section, I read the case of Korean 
comfort women through the lens of han. In the last section, I discuss how emotions shape 
the nature and characteristics of public deliberation, moral judgment, and justice in the 
Korean context.  
 
Understanding the concept of Han 
 In her testimony as a former comfort woman, Hwang Keum Ju halmeoni 8 
remarked: 
 
Until today, there isn’t a part of my body that doesn’t hurt. Aches are everywhere 
in my body. I always wanted to lead a dignified life without other people’s 
                                          
8 Halmeoni (할머니) is an affectionate term for grandmother or a polite term of reference given to any 
woman old enough to be a grandmother. Contrary to the Western tradition, any kind of title attached to a 
person comes after the name. Prof. Smith, for instance, would be Smith Professor.  
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contempt or pity. (choking silence) I left home for a sick father. I agreed to work 
in “a Japanese factory” or whatever it was to live my life with dignity. But look at 
what happened to my life. No matter how hard I try, it is impossible to describe 
what Japan did to me, to hundreds and thousands of young women. It is even more 
difficult to describe how I feel. Japan tore my human dignity into shreds and 
through no fault of mine, Japan inflicted pain and shame on me. Nothing they can 
do now can make this up.9 
 
 What Hwang is expressing here is han, a broad, if not esoteric, concept that, in the 
absence of a clear English-equivalent, can be described as sorrow, yearning, anguish, 
shame, isolation, and regret caused by injustice done to a person or to a collective. At the 
age of twelve, Hwang left home to earn money to support her poverty-stricken family. She 
was promised a factory job in Japan but the job awaiting her was unlike anything she had 
imagined. She served as a sex slave for the Japanese military for eight years in China. The 
experience shattered her body and her soul. Upon liberation, she returned to Korea but 
never returned to her family, married or had children. When the Korean War broke out, she 
took care of orphans—five in all—all of whom she left at an orphanage. But they all found 
their way back to her and were the only “family” she had. She died in 2013 at the age of 
                                          
9 Dai Sil Kim-Gibson, Silence Broken: Korean Comfort Women (Parkersburg, Iowa: Mid-Prairie Books, 
1999), 29-30. 
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92.10 
 To be sure, feelings of resentment, sorrow, and grief in the situation of injustice is 
not unique to Korea. Anyone who has been wronged or treated unfairly has experienced 
them to some degree or another. As human history has repeatedly demonstrated that there 
is more injustice than justice in the world, such feelings are a normal and inevitable part of 
collective life. Yet han is distinctive in three important aspects. 
  First is that it manifests in both psychological and physiological forms and for an 
extended period of time. According to minjung11 theologian Suh Nam-dong, han is a 
“feeling of unresolved resentment against injustices suffered, a sense of helplessness 
because of the overwhelming odds against one, a feeling of acute pain in one’s guts and 
bowels, making the whole body writhe and squirm, and an obstinate urge to take revenge 
and to right the wrong—all these combined.”12 As Hwang’s testimony suggests, han 
involves both prolonged emotional and physical suffering.13  
 Secondly, it can be experienced at both individual and collective levels. At the 
                                          
10 Hwang Keum Ju (1922-2013). For her full testimony, see ibid., 12-31.  
11 Minjung theology was born in the 1970s of the struggle for social justice led by South Korean 
Christians. 
12 Boo-Wong Yoo. Korean Pentecostalism: Its History and Theology (Frankfurt Am Main: Peter Lang, 
1988), 221.  
13 Another Korean culture-bound syndrome that is closely related to han is hwa-byung, a Korean folk 
illness inflicted by prolonged suppression of anger. Hwa means “fire” in Korean. In Korean culture, fire 
and anger have a very close affinity. Patients who suffer from hwa-byung also complain of physical 
discomfort caused by a mass in their abdomen area and fear of impending death. However, it is typically 
the case that the mass is not present on physical examination. To clarify, han and hwa overlap but whereas 
han includes a broad set of emotions, hwa is more specifically associated with anger. For further insight 
into hwa-byung, see K. M. Lin, "Hwa-Byung: A Korean Culture-bound Syndrome?" The American Journal 
of Psychiatry 140, no. 1 (1983): 105-7. 
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individual level, any person can feel han upon being subject to injustice or unfair treatment. 
In general, however, han is more pervasive among those who are powerless, marginalized, 
oppressed, and exploited. Hence women tend to feel han more than men due to the way 
they have long been perceived and treated in the Korean society.14 The Confucian way of 
life made women subordinate to and dependent on men. They had little identity of their 
own besides being a mother, a wife, or a daughter. Women who did not conform to the 
prescribed social norms—such as kisaeng15—were looked down upon and treated with 
contempt. While present-day Korea is much less stringent and offers women opportunities 
outside the home, Confucian values of family, hierarchy, and social harmony persist and 
can be found in many aspects of Korean life.  
 At a national level, han is shared by all Koreans by virtue of being a Korean. It 
emanates not only from the internal tensions arising from rigid social structure but also 
from the country’s past history of dependence and submission. Throughout history, Korea 
struggled with constant threats of invasion from its neighbors due to its geographic location. 
During the first half of the Chosun dynasty (1392-1897),16 Korea was under the powerful 
cultural influence of China which considered Korea its client state. Han became 
particularly acute in the first half of the twentieth century as Korea underwent thirty-five 
                                          
14 The best-selling novel Pachinko by Min Jin Lee vividly captures the sufferings of ordinary Korean 
women and the hardships they had to face in life, particularly during the period of Japanese colonization. 
See Min Jin Lee, Pachinko. (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2017). 
15 Kisaeng (“기생”) were women who were trained in music, dance, fine art, and poetry to entertain the 
nobility. Some also provided sexual services. Kisaeng were considered lower-class. 
16 Chosun dynasty (1392-1897) was founded by Yi Seong-Gye, a military commander during the Goryo 
dynasty (918-1392). Confuscianism was the official state ideology of Chosun.  
 
 
 
49 
years of Japanese colonization (1910-1945), only to be further intensified by the 
devastating Korean War (1950-1953) and the externally enforced partition of the Korean 
peninsula. Indeed, a strong sense of victimhood, frustration and anger over unresolved 
injustice run deep in the Korean society.   
 Third, han finds expression, implicit and explicit, in nearly all areas of Korean 
society. In studying a broad range of Korean films, Professor Back Moon-im found that 
han has been “at the core of cultural discourse” 17  since the 1960s when rapid 
modernization and social changes left people searching for ways to reclaim and rebuild 
national identity that had been displaced due to decades of colonization. To this day, 
accumulated sorrow and deep-seated desire for vengeance against oppressors are popular 
subjects of films, narratives, and songs.18 Han, simply put, occupies a central place in 
Korea’s national identity and culture. Korea Times Columnist Jon Huer wrote, “Virtually 
all of Korea’s institutions and persons are under the powerful influence of han. Virtually 
all of Koreans have a deep-seated grief and grievance that they have been wronged by some 
very powerful agents of injustice.”19 Huer went on to comment that anyone wishing to 
understand Korea must first understand han: otherwise, one’s understanding would be 
                                          
17 Roland Bleiker and Young-ju Hoang, “Korean Sources of Conflict Resolution: An Inquiry into the 
Concept of Han,” in Mediating across Difference: Oceanic and Asian Approaches to Conflict Resolution. 
Writing Past Colonialism. Edited by Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2011), 248-269. For details see Baek Moon-im, “Melodrama wa Hanui Mihak” [Melodrama and the 
Esthetics of Han], Minjokmunhaksa Yeonku 299: 243.  
18 Baek, “Melodrama wa Hanui Mihak,” 243.  
19 Jon Huer, “Psychology of Korean Han,” The Korean Times. March 22, 2009. 
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“wholly inadequate.”20 Ko Eun, a prominent Korean poet also claimed, “We Koreans are 
born from the womb of Han and brought up in the womb of Han.”21 Huer and Ko’s 
remarks are, of course, only two of many interpretations of Han. But what is clear is that 
han is much more than a sentiment; it is a key character trait that is representative of all 
Korean experiences and plays a critical role in defining Korean-ness. 
 
The Centrality of Emotions in the Korean Culture  
 Since the time of ancient Greece, reason has occupied a central place in Western 
political life. In Book IV of Republic, Plato describes a human soul that is divided into 
three forms: reason, spirit (passions and will) and appetite (physical desires).22 The three 
parts are not equal but hierarchical in standing. A just person is someone who has a full 
command of reason allied with spiritedness against appetite. Justice at the individual level 
therefore coincides with the virtue of the soul where reason reigns supreme. At the political 
level, individuals are categorized into three groups depending on the quality of the soul 
that they each possess: the rulers (philosopher kings), auxiliaries (warriors), and producers 
(farmers, artisans, etc.). Equipped with the ability to comprehend the Form and the desire 
for knowledge, rulers govern the polis and make moral judgments in the interest of the 
common good. The auxiliaries, endowed with natural courage, are responsible for 
protecting the city from invasions and ensuring peace at home by enforcing the decisions 
                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Yoo, Korean Pentecostalism, 222.  
22 Allan David Bloom, The Republic of Plato. 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1991). 
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of the rulers. The producers, the largest class which includes a broad range of professions, 
focus on exercising the skills they are befitted with and follow whatever the rulers 
command. A just society, in other words, is where reason rules, spirit aids reason, and 
appetite obeys.  
 In the eighteenth century, reason played a principal role in the ethical theory of 
Immanuel Kant which continues to exercise tremendous influence in the field of Western 
moral and political philosophy. Writing in a time when the idea that emotions and desires 
shape moral decisions was gaining support,23 Kant argued in his groundbreaking work 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that the foundation of morality lies in reason.24 
The rightness of an action, in his view, is knowable, not from experience, but a priori. It is 
to be judged solely by the character of the principle one acts upon, not by the consequences 
it produces. To support this claim, he established the famous categorical imperative, a 
supreme moral concept that demands individuals to act only in a way that the maxim upon 
which they act could become a universal law. By following the categorical imperative, 
individuals are able to put aside private desires and inclinations and determine moral right 
and wrong objectively. Kant was indeed the first to propose a moral theory that was 
designed to be applicable in all situations.  
                                          
23 The most prominent advocate of moral sentimentalism was David Hume (1711-1776). See his A Treatise 
of Human Nature (1738) and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) in which he argued 
that sentiment drives morality and that morality has non-rational character.  
24 Immanuel Kant and James W. Ellington, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals; With, On a 
Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns. 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1993). 
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 Following in this rationalist tradition, John Rawls, in what is perhaps the single 
most influential 20th century work on justice, A Theory of Justice, argued that justice is 
essentially about fairness between individuals and is grounded in the principles of equal 
liberty and equal opportunity.25 To illustrate his claim, he uses the hypothetical device 
called the “original position” in which individuals are put behind the “veil of ignorance.” 
Being “ignorant” of the details of oneself, reason prompts self-interested individuals to 
choose principles of justice that are in the best interest of all. That is, not knowing their 
own attributes induces individuals to choose principles that benefit the most disadvantaged, 
in case they are in that group, but that also allow for the pursuit of opportunities, in case 
they are not among the most disadvantaged and have attributes to pursue them. In this way, 
a universal conception of justice is possible. Like Kant, Rawls believed that reason alone 
formed the basis for the principles of justice and the public conception of morality. 
 Indeed reason has long been a starting point for philosophic inquiries, generating 
a wealth of contemporary scholarship that supports, questions, and challenges its 
implications. Jürgen Habermas, for instance, contends that the rational potential emerging 
from interpersonal communications serves as a precondition for a genuine democracy.26 
Michael Sandel, on the other hand, finds Rawls’s conception of self in his theory of justice 
to be overly individualistic. He claims that the self does not exist in a vacuum but is 
                                          
25 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971). 
26 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol I. Reason and the Rationality of Society, 
Trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). 
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constituted and defined by the nature and character of communities to which one belongs. 
He went on to present an alternative notion of the self as “encumbered” by being associated 
with a certain collectivity and the duties accompanying this association. 27  Alasdair 
MacIntyre and Charles Taylor also emphasize the role of particular ways of life in shaping 
the conception of the good. In their view, an excellent moral judgment does not come from 
abstract reasoning about universal obligations but from understanding morals in connection 
to the community from which one comes.28 Iris Young, in another forceful line of attack, 
argues that the Rawlsian conception of justice privileges a select group of people while 
ignoring the rest, particularly those who are marginalized, weak and powerless. 
Consequently, the rationalist approaches falls short of being impartial and devising 
universally valid norms.29 
 The problem, however, is that while all of these thinkers offer criticisms that are 
no doubt highly important, they are still unable to do away with the deeply entrenched 
Western assumptions about the primacy of reason in political life. They continue to operate 
in a culture of reason which they seek to rectify but cannot subvert altogether. In this respect, 
a historically-generated and affective moral paradigm that is specific to Korea is beyond 
                                          
27 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).  
28 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Charles 
Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1989). 
29 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford Political Theory (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1990).  
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the scope of their philosophic imagination. The concept of han is therefore worth exploring 
because it engages emotions on its own terms. Unlike Westerners, Koreans perceive and 
respond to issues of injustice and moral considerations in a deeply emotional and personal 
way even in public. There are three aspects of the Korean culture that help explain why 
this is so.  
 First is the sheer breadth of vocabulary and expressions pertaining to emotions that 
forms an integral part of the Korean language and culture. As Bleiker and Hoang have 
indicated, it is challenging, if not impossible, to convey the implications of these linguistic 
attributes given the absence of corresponding words, expressions and concepts in English. 
To demonstrate the nature and character of the Korean language, they provide an extract 
of a text written by a Korean scholar of han which, although written in English, still 
demonstrates the centrality of emotions in the Korean cultural context. Here, I share the 
text: 
 
Han is a knot of life alive embedded down at the bottom of unconsciousness. It is 
a feeling of the long accumulated pains, outrages, frustrations, losses, sorrows and 
regrets felt during the course of our unfulfilled life in this world, or a sentiment of 
missing and yearning. It is, for the Korean people, the source of the wounds and 
scars of their life and soul, of their sighs and lamentations, of their resignations 
and frustrations, their curses and hates, and their sadism and masochism. It would 
sometimes become the malaise of defeatism resulting from rotting resignation or 
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despair which must be get [sic] rid of and overcome for a healthy and vibrant life.30 
 
 From the Western perspective, such style of writing would be considered too 
subjective and inappropriate, if not unprofessional, in an academic context. A much more 
neutral language and an impartial tone would be expected. But in Korea, texts that are fused 
with deep emotions and personal sentiments are not uncommon even in a scholarly journal. 
Consider also the following text, an extract taken from the Declaration of Korean 
Independence of 1919: 
 
Behold! A new world is before our eyes. The days of force are gone, and the days 
of morality are here. The spirit of humanity, nurtured throughout the past century, 
has begun casting its rays of new civilization upon human history. A new spring 
has arrived prompting the myriad forms of life to come to life again. The past was 
a time of freezing ice and snow, stifling the breath of life; the present is a time of 
mild breezes and warm sunshine, reinvigorating the spirit. Facing the return of the 
universal cycle, we set forth on the changing tide of the world. Nothing can make 
us hesitate or fear.31 
                                          
30 Bleiker and Hoang, “Korean Sources of Conflict Resolution: An Inquiry into the Concept of Han,” 252. 
For further details see Jae Soon Park, “Han (恨) and Shinmyong: The suffering soul and liberating life of 
the oppressed people,” Korean Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (1999): 211.  
31 For a full translation of the Declaration of Korean Independence (March 1, 1919) see: 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/korea/march_first_declaration.pdf.  
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And compare it with an abstract from the American Declaration of Independence of 1776:32 
 
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be 
changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, 
that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right 
themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a 
long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces 
a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, 
to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. 
Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the 
necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The 
history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and 
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny 
over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.  
 
 Filled with bright imagery and metaphors, the former reads more like poetry 
intended to evoke strong emotions. The tone is upbeat and forward-looking. The latter, on 
the other hand, is essentially argumentative prose explaining why the American colonies 
have no other choice but to seek independence from the British Crown. What follows the 
                                          
32 For the full text of US Declaration of Independence (1776) see: https://www.archives.gov/founding-
docs/declaration-transcript.  
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text is a long description of each of the “injuries” and “usurpations” to which the British 
Crown have subjected the American colonies; they are the “evidence” that justify the need 
for a new government. The differences in the character and literary style of the two 
declaratory statements are indeed striking.  
 The second reason also has to do with the Korean language: more precisely, the 
conceptual and semantic ambiguities concerning the distinction between self (“나”) and us 
(“우리”). In a 2015 public lecture series called, “Koreans: Who are we?”,33 organized by 
Plato Academy and Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, Lee Ki-Dong, a Confucius scholar 
and a professor at Sungkyungwan University, showed two paintings of bamboo trees side-
by-side. One painting showed two bamboo trees standing separately above ground. The 
other painting showed two bamboo trees standing separately above ground but had a shared 
root below the earth. The first painting, he explained, represented the Western perception 
of self, while the second painting, demonstrated the Korean understanding of self in relation 
to us. The idea of “one root” (“한뿌리,”) or “one mind/soul”  (“한마음”)34 is, in short, a unique 
aspect of the nature of the relationship between the individual and the collective in Korea. 
 The notion of “one root” is evident in the linguistic usage of the terms self and us. 
In the Western culture, us is a collective of many independent selves. The difference 
                                          
33 This lecture series is available for public viewing in Korean on Youtube at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4MX14arqjGIT. This particular segment was filmed on November 16, 
2015. 
34 In both of these terms, han- means one. Note that this han is an entirely different concept than han as an 
emotion. 
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between us and self is in the number of selves; more than one self becomes us. But 
throughout the process of becoming us the identity of self as an independent agent never 
changes. In Korea, this is not necessarily the case. To be sure, us can be a collective of 
many selves. But more often than not, the assurance of being a self comes from being part 
of us. In other words, the identity of self easily coincides with the identity of us. For 
instance, if I were to say, “Let’s go to my house,” in English, it would automatically 
translate into “Let’s go to our house” in Korean. The house that I am referring to is not my 
property but the property of the collective of which I am a member; hence it is not my house 
but ours. The notions of mine and ours, put another way, are interchangeable and do not 
have clear boundaries.  
 These linguistic and conceptual ambiguities have important implications in the 
way individuals relate to each other and shape societal norms, values, and practices. While 
the Western influence has increasingly shifted the focus to the self—especially among the 
younger people in Korea—the prevailing mood is that us precedes self and that us is what 
makes the existence of self possible from the very beginning. A well-knowing Korean 
saying, “Are we not but one (family)?” (“우리가 남이가?”)”—or “Are you saying that you and 
I are ‘others’ or ‘unrelated’?”—is representative of the “one root” mentality that permeates 
the Korean society and of the extent to which the needs of family, community, and the 
nation are placed above that of a single person.  
 A prime example of this collectivist way of life is the gold campaign that took 
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place soon after the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s.35 In order to 
repay the $58 billion loan South Korea received from the International Monetary Fund as 
part of the bailout package, the South Korean government made a public appeal for gold 
to be sold on the international markets. Millions of South Koreans stood in line for hours 
to donate gold in all forms–wedding rings, family heirlooms, keys, medals, and trophies—
and within the first two days of the campaign, ten tons of gold were collected. In times of 
national emergency, Koreans do not hesitate to make personal sacrifices and work together 
to overcome any challenges that come their way. Likewise, when an injustice is inflicted 
upon a person, it quickly becomes not simply a matter that concerns the affected individual 
but a matter that concerns the entire group to which one belongs. “Your affair is my affair, 
my affair is your affair” (“네 일이 내 일이고, 내 일이 네 일이지”) Koreans often say. Such 
mentality helps turn emotions such as han into a kind of “co-emotion,” as I would like to 
call it, that is readily shared among all Koreans and serves as a unifying force.36 
 Third, unlike in the West where emotion tends to be viewed primarily as a private 
experience, vocalizing emotions in Korea is in fact an important part of cultural life. A case 
in point is the traditional funeral rite, parts of which are still practiced today. One of the 
key characteristics of Korean funeral traditions is the act of wailing that is known as gok. 
                                          
35 Kate Liang, “Koreans give up their gold to help their country,” BBC, January 14, 1998. 
36 Another important Korean emotion is jeong (“정” which means affection, understanding, and warmth) 
People can feel jeong towards their families, friends, neighbors, coworkers, strangers (by virtue of having 
gone to the same school or being from the same hometown, for instance), or even objects that are dear to 
them.  
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(“곡”). There are four types of gok: first, tong-gok (“통곡”), a loud, intense, cathartic cry one 
releases upon losing immediate family members such as grandparents, parents, siblings, or 
husband and wife; second, ae-gok (“애곡”), less intense but continuous weeping that lasts 
throughout the mourning period; third, yae-gok (“예곡), a repeated, ceremonial cry (“ae-go, 
ae-go, ae-go”) expressed by the family of the deceased upon receiving guests arriving at 
the funeral home to pay their respect; and lastly, jomungaek-gok (“조문객곡”), a repeated, 
ceremonial cry (“heo-hee, heo-hee, heo-hee”) on the part of the visitors in response to yae-
gok of the family of the deceased. Intense crying, in other words, is a customary practice 
intended to demonstrate the extent of loss and the value of the deceased to the family as 
well as to the society at large.  
 In modern day Korea, the tradition of ceremonial cries—particularly the latter two 
of the four—have died out. Yet, the practice of wailing loudly and behaving visibly grieved 
by the family of the deceased in front of guests persists. Indeed “sea of tears” is the common 
phrase used in the Korean media to describe scenes of uncontrollable wailing—reunion of 
separated families at Mount Kumgang Resort in North Korea or premature or unexpected 
deaths come to mind. The point, in any case, is that expressing intense emotions in public 
is not a source of shame or an act that is frowned upon by viewers but an integral part of 
Korean society that has deep cultural roots.     
 
Reading the Case of Comfort Women through the Lens of Han 
 In light of the discussion of the centrality of han and the emphasis on emotions in 
 
 
 
61 
the Korean culture, I suggest that one way to understand and analyze the challenges 
surrounding the case of Korean Comfort Women is through the lens of culture-bound affect. 
In my view, the principal reason that the case is so difficult to resolve despite many attempts 
by the Japanese and the Korean governments to reach an agreement is the failure to 
understand han. It is this intense feeling of sorrow, yearning, anguish, shame, isolation, and 
regret that these women have accumulated in the deepest end of their heart throughout their 
lives that stands in the way and disables them from accepting anything less than what they 
have been demanding repeatedly over the years: an official apology from the Japanese 
Prime Minister and an acknowledgement of Japan’s legal responsibility over the 
government-sponsored comfort system. The former has arguably come—in varying 
degrees of sincerity but none of which the victims have accepted as being genuine 
enough—but the latter has clearly yet to arrive.  
 The revelation of the existence of wartime “comfort women” for the Japanese 
Imperial Army during WWII catapulted into international limelight in 1991, nearly half a 
century after the end of the war, when Kim Hak Sun, a former “comfort woman” from 
Korea, testified in public for the first time that she was forcibly taken by the Japanese 
military to serve as a sex slave throughout the duration of the war.37 Kim was one of 
hundreds of thousands of women—the vast majority of whom were Koreans but also 
                                          
37 Margaret D. Stetz, “Wartime Sexual Violence against Women: A Feminist Response” in Legacies of the 
Comfort Women of World War II Edited by Margaret Stetz and Bonnie B. C. Oh (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2001), 16. 
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Chinese, Malaysians, Indonesians and some Europeans—who had been put into “comfort 
houses” against their will and subjected to repeated rapes, hard labor, physical and verbal 
abuse and sometimes even murder by the Japanese army. In response to the intransigence 
of the Japanese government, Kim and two other Korean “comfort women” filed a lawsuit 
at the Tokyo District Court, demanding reparations and an official apology from the 
Japanese government for its wartime atrocities. Their actions marked the beginning of a 
long journey in pursuit of justice and restoration of honor and dignity that they had lost.  
 But the journey that began in 1991 is only the very last segment of a much longer 
journey that they have been on since the beginning of their lives. A writer and documentary 
filmmaker, Dae Sil Kim-Gibson who has interviewed and worked closely with dozens of 
these women, wrote:  
  
Most oral accounts in print of the former military comfort women are primarily 
summaries of interviews conducted by scholars or journalists with a focus on their 
years as comfort women. If those women told stories beyond “that period,” that 
information was not included in the majority of the oral histories. It is as if their 
existence is justified solely by the horrendous years they suffered; nothing before 
or after that seems to matter. Saddest of all, the women themselves are convinced 
of that. Further, in the name of objectivity and scholarship, much of their stories 
are refined, hence taking away the raw pain and feelings from their stories. They 
have largely become issues, numbers, things, and objects of studies, not full 
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blooded human beings. It was important for me to present their lives—before, 
during and after—as much or as little as they told me.38  
 
 To be sure, being forced to serve in comfort stations is one of the worst forms of 
human rights violations that one can ever experience. But the sad reality is that there is 
much more to the stories of these women than the mental and bodily harms that they had 
endured during their wartime captivity. It was not mere chance that they became sex slaves 
but the specific cultural and societal context in which they lived that provided the 
preconditions for their enslavement whether it was voluntary or coerced.39 Otherwise, the 
fact that most of these women were from poor families, little educated, and above all, single 
and young—mostly under the age of twenty which suggested that they were virgins—
becomes difficult to explain. In other words, the lives that they led before the war were 
representative of the repressive lives of women in a Confucian society where women 
existed primarily for men and chastity was regarded as one of the highest virtues of Korean 
women—a point that the Japanese knew well of and did not hesitate to expropriate. Hence, 
their background made them particularly more vulnerable. Consider the following abstract 
from the testimony of Kang Soon Ae halmeoni: 
                                          
38 Kim-Gibson, Silence Broken, 9.  
39 Scholars have noted that there was a diverse representation of comfort women and that the methods of 
recruitment were much more complex than frequently assumed. See Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women: 
Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan. Worlds of Desire (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008).  
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When I was fourteen, news abounded that the Japanese were drafting virgins. In 
desperation, I wore a married woman’s hairdo, you know, hair all gathered at the 
back, and held together by a pin called pinyo. I also stayed home. In those days, 
food was rationed once a month at a designated place. When my grandmother went 
to get the rationed supplies, she was sent back empty handed. In order to receive 
the goods, we were forced to sing the Japanese anthem, Kimi ga yo. My 
grandmother didn’t know the words.  
 
I decided to go and sing Kimi ga yo. I was given more rice than the usual amount. 
They also gave me two pairs of rubber shoes. One I gave to my grandmother and 
the other to my younger sister. Shortly after that, I was taken to comfort the 
Imperial soldiers.40 
 
In other words, these women were already at the periphery of the society even before they 
were taken by the Japanese.  
 The plight of the comfort women, however, did not improve much after the end of 
the Japanese occupation. In most cases, the survivors were subject to shame, prejudice, 
ostracization and gender-based double standards upon return. While “former soldiers and 
                                          
40 Kim-Gibson, Silence Broken, 43. 
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officers who had sex with comfort women” were able to reintegrate and resume “family 
and marital life,” comfort women suffered from the “humiliation of social stigma and 
isolation in their postwar lives.”41 According to Sarah Soh, “masculinist sexual culture 
exerted differently on gendered lives of men and women” both during and after the war.42 
She observed that the suffering of these women “arose within not only the comfort women 
system and broader parameters of Japanese colonialism” but also within “patriarchy and 
its political economy” that facilitated masculinist public-sex culture and abuse of poor 
women in particular.43   
 Furthermore, in 1965, Japan and South Korea entered into the Basic Treaty which 
normalized Japan-Korea relations and provided Korea $200 million in damages for 
modernization and industrial development. 44  Although the treaty also included the 
settlements of war crimes committed by the Japanese against Koreans during World War 
II, the issue of comfort women never came up. In her testimony, Hwang Keum Ju halmeoni 
recalled her encounter with First Lady Yuk Young-Soo, the wife of the then President Park 
Chung-Hee, on a visit to her hometown: 
 
I told her briefly about myself and the women who served Japanese soldiers and 
                                          
41 Soh, The Comfort Women, 176-177.  
42 Ibid. 176. 
43 Ibid. 177. 
44 Bonnie B.C. Oh, “The Japanese Imperial System and the Korean “Comfort Women” of World War II” in 
Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II Edited by Margaret Stetz and Bonnie B. C. Oh (Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 14. 
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asked why the Korean government did not do something for us. Her face became 
ashen and she grabbed my hands and said quietly, but with the ring of urgency. 
“Please don’t ever repeat this story. You must not talk about this with anybody else. 
Korea and Japan have already signed a treaty to take care of the matters concerning 
the two countries during the colonial period. When times are better, when we have 
true peace, perhaps, something like this could be discussed and resolved. But now 
is not the best time. Korea needs to move forward. This is a matter of the past that 
should not be brought up again now.” She looked into my eyes and stressed again, 
“Do you understand? You never told me this story and you will never mention it 
to anybody else. This is a dangerous story.” So I put my story under my feet, turned 
around and went home crying my hearts out.45 
  
 The truth of Hwang’s testimony, of course, cannot be verified since Yuk died in 
1974. Nonetheless, her story does offer a glimpse into how the emphasis on nation-building 
and economic development made everything else including the rights of former sex slaves 
secondary. What was worse, there was virtually no freedom of speech during Park’s 
presidency as “open, grass-root deliberation of any subject, let alone a taboo subject” was 
effectively banned.46  
 South Korea’s transition from a dictatorship to a democracy in 1987 was therefore 
                                          
45 Kim-Gibson, Silence Broken, 21. 
46 Oh, “The Japanese Imperial System and the Korean “Comfort Women” of World War II”, 14. 
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an important turning point that enabled these women to finally break the silence. With help 
of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, a non-
profit organization founded in 1990 by a group of progressive Christian women who were 
one of the first to inquire about the comfort system, surviving women began to come 
forward and testify on both national and international platforms. They continue to maintain 
their voice and visibility in the Korean society by participating in the weekly protests, also 
known as “Wednesday demonstrations,” that began on January 8, 1992, in front of the 
Japanese Embassy, and demanding justice from the Japanese government.  
 In this regard, the 2015 agreement, which came as a complete surprise, was a major 
source of outrage for all those concerned.47 The Korean Council immediately rejected it 
as being utterly unacceptable given the absence of an “irreversible”48 apology from the 
Japanese government and the acknowledgement of its “legal” responsibility. The United 
Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women drew 
attention to the fact that the deal “did not meet standards of State accountability for gross 
                                          
47 According to one public survey conducted on the Korean citizenry, 50.7% of the respondents did not 
support the deal. For more details see: Trevor Kennedy, “Public divided over ‘comfort women’ agreement,” 
East Asia Forum, January 22, 2016. For full text see: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/22/public-
divided-over-comfort-women-agreement/. 
48 Given the Japanese government’s history of giving then reversing an apology repeatedly, victims have 
been demanding an apology that is “irreversible.” During the negotiation process, the Korean government 
requested that the apology be in the form of a Japanese Cabinet resolution that is irreversible and of higher 
formality. For the full text of the Report on the Review of the Korea-Japan Agreement of December 28, 105 
on the Issue of “Comfort Women” Victims see: 
http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=319637&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=victim&srch
Tp=0&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm=.  
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human rights violations and was reached without a proper consultation process.”49 On 
December 27, 2017, the Task Force on the Review of the Korea-Japan Agreement on the 
Issue of “Comfort Women” Victims50 issued an Assessment Report on the negotiation 
process and the substance of the agreement. It cited as the agreement’s key flaw a failure 
to sufficiently reflect a victim-oriented approach—which necessarily begins with talking 
to the victims and hearing their stories, and asking what they want. Indeed it is the failure 
to understand the han of these women that led to the agreement’s near collapse.  
 
Operation of Historically-Generated and Affective Moral Paradigm in South Korea 
and its Implications 
 The predominance of han in Korean society offers important insights into how 
emotions shape the nature and characteristics of public deliberation, morality, and justice 
in the Korean context. First, the definitive mode of communication is not reason but 
emotive expressions; that is, when push comes to shove, emotions can easily overwhelm 
reasoned and logical arguments—however robust they may be. When the South Korean 
Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam visited the House of Sharing—a nursing home for 
surviving comfort women in Seoul—Lee Yong-su, one of the women living there, 
                                          
49 For full text of the Reaction of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women see://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17209.  
50 In response to vehement public criticism, the Task Force was created on July 31, 2017 by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Korea in order to review and assess the process and substance of the Agreement. To 
access the full report in English see: 
http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=319637&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=victim&srch
Tp=0&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm=. 
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immediately started shouting to his face, “Which country do you belong to? You could 
have at least let us know what kind of deal you were striking with Japan. Why are you 
trying to kill us twice?51 The video clip shows Lim trying to calm Lee down and explain 
to her the rationale behind the agreement but Lee simply refuses to listen and is visibly 
shaking. She continues to yell at him without giving him a chance to talk and claims it is 
because she is old and ignorant that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thinks it can decide her 
fate.  
 It goes without saying that the 2015 agreement was not ideal and came short of 
meeting the victim’s expectations. Yet, from the perspective of the South Korean 
government, it was still a much needed deal in light of the increasingly hostile security 
environment in East Asia and, especially, the advanced age of the surviving victims. The 
rationale behind it was that with an apology from Abe and a guarantee of financial 
compensation, these women would be able to put their painful memories behind them and 
live the remainder of their lives in peace. The deal was also “a step forward”—albeit 
small—from the previous attempts at negotiation. For instance, concerning the issue of 
government responsibility in the operation of comfort houses, the Kono Statement of 
August 1993 simply had no mention of it while the Prime Minister’s letter of 1995 included 
a qualifier—specifically, “moral” responsibility.52 The 2015 statement, on the other hand, 
                                          
51 Tessa Berenson, “Watch a Korean ‘Comfort’ Woman explode with anger at a foreign minister,” Time, 
December 31, 2015. http://time.com/4164990/korean-comfort-woman-video/.  
52 See page 10 of the Task Force Report. 
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succeeded in removing the qualifier “moral” though failed to substitute “legal” as 
demanded by the victims. In addition, the expressions of apology and remorse took the 
most official and sincere tone to date. The agreement in fact attracted acclaim from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany at the time of its announcement for 
killing two birds with one stone.53  
 What the episode suggests is that intense emotions such as han leave little room 
for a reasoned debate that is viewed as key to ensuring the legitimacy of the deliberative 
process as well as the consensus reached. In the context of Western liberal democracy, the 
norm is that individuals present their case and justify their position using reason and logic. 
Implicit in the process is that decisions are made solely on the merits of arguments. Indeed 
the dominant perception of public deliberation is that it is, first and foremost, a rational 
activity and that any display of intense emotions can undermine the impartiality of the 
decision-making process. In the case of Korea, however, the opposite is true. There are 
attempts to persuade, negotiate, or compromise to form a consensus among the parties 
involved, to be sure. But outbursts of emotions can eclipse them all and quickly turn the 
issue at hand into a matter that is all-or-nothing. Huer commented: 
 
It is this han, also, that makes political, economic and cultural compromises 
difficult to achieve here. Each group, especially the underclass, such as labor 
                                          
53 Yukari Easton, “Japan must not renegotiate the Comfort Women Agreement,” The Diplomat, December 
30, 2017. 
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unions, swears that they oppose this or that with their “death,” whether it is a 
routine labor strike, opposing a government plan to build a crematorium in their 
neighborhood, or deciding on a waste disposal site. It is almost always: “We 
oppose this or whatever with our death!” How Korea may achieve the rank of a 
first-rate nation, where compromise and rationality are the hallmark of 
international behavior, may be most sorely tested by their nemesis—the han.54 
 
 Huer is right in that han is an impediment to compromise and rationality that he 
calls “the hallmark of international behavior.” But what Huer is not getting is the fact that, 
despite the frustrations caused by han, few Koreans would criticize the halmeonis for 
failing to adhere to such international norms. In fact, most Koreans would likely side with 
the victims, express sympathy, and criticize the South Korean government for failing to do 
its part—that is, for killing these women twice instead of bringing justice that they deserve. 
This brings us to the second important insight into the relations among public deliberation, 
morality and justice that operate in South Korean society: that victimhood is what 
legitimates the affective modes of communication and defines the nature and character of 
justice. Simply stated, the low social standing of these women and their past experience of 
abuse and unfair treatment allow them to behave in the way they do—however “offensive” 
and “uncivil” they may appear from the outside perspective—and to insist on having things 
                                          
54 Huer, “Psychology of Korean Han,” The Korean Times. March 22, 2009. 
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their way without suffering consequences.  
 In revising the criteria for judging democratic deliberation, Jane Mansbridge wrote: 
 
Both in public forum and in everyday talk, there are justifiable places for 
offensiveness, noncooperation, and the threat of retaliation—even for raucous, 
angry, self-centered, bitter talk, aiming at nothing but hurt. These forms of talk are 
sometimes necessary not only to “promote mutual respect in the long term” (90),55 
but also to achieve authenticity, to reveal (as in “testimony”) the pain and anger, 
hate, or delight in another’s pain, that someone actually feels, when expression or 
knowledge of those feelings furthers the understanding that is the goal of 
deliberation. These uncivil forms of talk are also often necessary means to the end 
of approaching both liberty and equality in deliberation. Sometimes only intensity 
in opposition can break down the barriers of the status quo. No one always listens 
attentively to everyone else, and members of dominant groups are particularly 
likely to find they do not need to listen to members of subordinate groups. So 
subordinates sometimes need the battering ram of rage.56 
 
                                          
55 Here, Jane Mansbridge is quoting from Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis F Thompson. Democracy and 
Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 90. 
56 Jane Mansbridge, “Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System,” in Stephen Macedo and Amy 
Gutmann. Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. Practical and Professional Ethics 
Series. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 99. 
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The standard of reciprocity—one of the three criterion57 for judging deliberation that Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson proposed—Mansbridge argues, is not that “every 
interaction in the system exhibit mutual respect, consistency, acknowledgement, 
openmindedness, and moral economy, but that the larger system reflect those goals.”58 
Given the uneven distribution of power and resources among the participants, there must 
be a space for “unmediated authenticity” and “relatively unfettered” flow of both verbal 
and nonverbal communication in both public assemblies and in everyday talk.59 Non-
reciprocity, in other words, is sometimes required to achieve reciprocity.  
 “Reason and logic work fine when factual matters and tangible interests are in 
contention,” remarked Derek W. M. Barker of the Kettering Foundation, a non-partisan 
research institution that supports ongoing work on public deliberation, “but not when 
values derived from identity and religious convictions are involved.”60 The emotionally-
charged exchanges between the former comfort women and the Vice Foreign Minister Lim 
Sung-nam at the House of Sharing, for example, levelled the status of two parties. By 
publicly humiliating the Vice Foreign Minister and accusing the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of siding with the Japanese, the women were able to recover the freedom and 
                                          
57 The other two criterion for judging deliberation are publicity and accountability.  
58 Mansbridge, “Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System,” 99 
59 Ibid. 
60 Derek W. M. Barker, Noëlle McAfee, and David W. McIvor. Democratizing Deliberation: A Political 
Theory Anthology (Dayton OH: Kettering Foundation Press, 2012), ix. In a similar fashion, Charles 
Griswold also argued that, while limited, there are situations when intense emotions, such as vengeful 
anger, are justified. See Charles L Griswold, “The Nature and Ethics of Vengeful Anger,” in James E. 
Fleimng, Passions and Emotions (New York: NYU Press, 2012). 
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equality that they had been deprived of all their lives and effectively push the South Korean 
government to keep the issue in its future agenda instead of shelving it. Joshua Cohen 
argued that, in an ideal deliberation, participants are free and equal.61 In this specific 
instance, the victimhood of these women and the specific mode of deliberation that they 
resorted to had a democratizing effect. 
 In his new book, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, 
Francis Fukuyama discusses how modern liberal democracy is unable to solve the 
problems associated with culture and society, a point that he made in his previous works 
but was, he claims, misunderstood or overlooked by his critics: 
 
[M]y critics missed another point. They did not note that the original essay62 had 
a question mark at the end of the title, and they did not read the later chapters of 
The End of History and the Last Man that focused on the problem of Nietzsche’s 
Last Man. 
 
In both places, I noted that neither nationalism nor religion were about to disappear 
as forces in world politics. They were not about to disappear because, I argue back 
then, contemporary liberal democracies had not fully solved the problem of thymos. 
                                          
61 Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in Alan P. Hamlin and Philip Pettit, The 
Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
62 Fukuyama is referring to the essay “The End of History?” published in 1989. 
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Thymos is the part of the soul that craves recognition of dignity; isothymia is the 
demand to be respected on an equal basis with other people…. Modern liberal 
democracies promise and largely deliver a minimal degree of equal respect, 
embodied in individual rights, the rule of law, and the franchise. What this does 
not guarantee is that people in a democracy will be equally respected in practice, 
particularly members of groups with a history of marginalization. Entire countries 
can feel disrespected, which has powered aggressive nationalism, as can religious 
believers who feel their faith is denigrated. Isothymia will therefore continue to 
drive demands for equal recognition, which are unlikely to ever be completely 
fulfilled.63 
 
 The limits of liberal democratic doctrine—equal respect, individual rights, and the 
rule of law—that Fukuyama is referring to are conspicuous in the case of the Korean 
comfort women. Justice in Korea is far removed from being guided entirely by principles 
and the rule of law in any traditional sense—so much so that there is a common saying in 
South Korea that goes “Above the Constitution sits the Law of Emotions.”64 It is deeply 
partial to the historically powerless and almost always understood in terms of past events. 
                                          
63 Francis Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2018), xiii. 
64 Kim Jung-ho, “Let’s do it by Law,” Chosun Media, March 26, 2014. 
http://m.pub.chosun.com/mobile/news/view.asp?cate=C03&mcate=m1003&nNewsNumb=201403144388
&nidx=14486.  
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It is indeed first and foremost about recognizing and amending the past inequalities and 
alleviating the han of the victims. The viewpoint of the victims is therefore key to 
determining what is just and unjust, right and wrong, no matter how “skewed” or “uncivil” 
it may appear to the outside world. It is in this context that President Moon upon taking 
office rejected the agreement on the basis of emotions and reality of the people. The 2015 
agreement was a source of public outrage, to the extent that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
launched an internal Task Force to investigate the negotiation process and review the 
agreement, because it failed to address the collective feeling of han among all Koreans 
against their former colonizer. Unless the Japanese Prime Minister or the Japanese monarch 
performed a gesture of humility and penance towards the Korean people similar to the one 
performed by the German Chancellor Willy Brandt towards the victims of the Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising in 1970, the han of the Korean people is most likely to endure for some 
time and continue to manifest in varying degrees and forms of anti-Japanese sentiment.  
 
Conclusion 
 Han is a concept that is unique to Korea and difficult to understand for those 
unfamiliar with Korean history and culture. It plays a central role in Korean life as it 
operates at all levels of society—“from the highest historical-national level to the 
innermost-psychic feelings of the person.”65 It is, in other words, a “co-emotion” and a 
                                          
65 Huer, “Psychology of Korean Han,” The Korean Times. March 22, 2009. 
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key character trait that is representative of all Korean experiences and defines Korean-ness. 
Read through this lens of han, it is understandable why the case of Korean Comfort Women 
continues to be such a thorny issue with no foreseeable end in sight despite repeated efforts 
on the part of the government of South Korea and Japan. Indeed the han of the victims does 
not allow them to accept anything that falls short of their demands; the 2015 agreement, in 
this regard, is simply not enough, and the controversy remains unresolved.  
 What emerges from all of this is a moral paradigm that puts emotive expressions 
at the center of public deliberation and a conception of justice that requires a profound 
understanding of both history and culture of Korea. Morality and impartiality are derived, 
not from principles or reasoned judgment, but from the viewpoint of the victims. Indeed 
the standard of justice operating in Korea may be difficult to understand for those looking 
in from the outside. But from the perspective of Koreans, it makes a whole lot of sense and 
is, in its own way, free and equal.  
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Limits of Protests: The 2016-2017 Candlelight Protests and                      
Effecting Political Change in South Korea                     
 
Introduction 
 On March 10, 2017, the former South Korean President Park Geun-hye became 
the first sitting president in the history of South Korea to be removed from office by the 
judiciary.1 In an 8-0 unanimous ruling that was nationally broadcast, the Constitutional 
Court upheld the National Assembly’s December 9, 2016 vote to impeach Park, drawing 
to a close an immense corruption and influence-peddling scandal that rocked South Korea 
for months and prompted hundreds of thousands of people to take to the streets of Seoul 
and cities across the country calling for Park’s ouster for seventeen consecutive weeks in 
the bitter cold of winter. The 89-page decision found that Park violated the Constitution 
and other laws in the performance of her duties by abusing her position and authority to 
benefit Choi Soon Sil, her longtime confidante and a central figure in the scandal, and 
divulging to Choi confidential information pertaining to state affairs, speeches, schedule, 
and policies.2 Such conduct, the judges stated, “undermines the principle of representative 
                                          
1 Park Geun-hye was the first South Korean president to be impeached by both the judiciary and the 
legislature. On March 12, 2004, the National Assembly, led by the opposition parties, voted to impeach the 
then President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) on the grounds of illegal electioneering. On May 14, 2004, the 
Constitutional Court struck down the impeachment decision and restored Roh as president.  
2 Constitutional Court of Korea, “Case on the Impeachment of the President (Park Geun-hye), March 10, 
2017. An English translation of the Court’s decision is accessible to public at: 
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/decisions/majordecisions/majorDetail.do?searchClassCode=ENEX
ECLSS&searchClassSeq=560 
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democracy and the spirit of the rule of law,” and constitutes “a betrayal of the people’s 
confidence.” 3  Since “the benefits of protecting the Constitution by removing the 
respondent from office overwhelmingly outweigh the national loss that would be incurred 
by the removal of the President,” Park, they concluded, must be dismissed.4  
 The Court’s decision was widely celebrated as a triumph of the rule of law and 
democracy and a turning point in the political history of South Korea. Upon impeachment, 
Park was immediately stripped of presidential immunity and, on March 31, 2017, was 
indicted and arrested on the charges of abuse of power, coercion, bribery, and leaking 
classified government information. On April 6, 2018, the Central District Court in Seoul 
sentenced Park to twenty-four years of jail time as well as 18 billion Korean wons 
(approximately 16.8 million USD) in fines following the verdict that she was guilty of 
sixteen out of eighteen charges brought before her. Meanwhile, her successor, President 
Moon Jae-in who took office in May 2017 continues to be wildly popular, garnering the 
highest-ever first-year job approval rating for a South Korean president—83% according 
to both Korean Broadcasting System and Gallup Korea.5 The sweeping victory by Moon’s 
party, the ruling Democratic Party, in the June 13, 2018 local and parliamentary by-
elections was, in the view of many, a ringing endorsement for Moon’s liberal leadership 
                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Thomas Maresca, “South Korea’s Moon Jae-in is more popular than ever,” USA Today, May 10, 2018. 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/05/10/south-korea-moon-jae-approval-rating-popularity-
north-korea/597557002/.  
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and initiatives.6 In this regard, the events of 2016-2017 marked a long-waited departure 
from the legacies of Park Chung-hee, Park’s father and arguably the most prominent figure 
in the history of South Korea who ruled the country with an iron-fist from 1961 until his 
assassination in 1979, giving rise to the Left as the leading force in South Korean politics.  
 Yet not everything has changed for the better, if at all. For one thing, profound 
distrust of government institutions and the laws persists. To many South Koreans, of equal 
historical significance to Park’s fall was the indictment and the trial of Lee Jae-yong, 
known as Jay Y. Lee in the West, the de facto leader of the Samsung Group and the 
grandson of the company’s founder the late Lee Byung-chul. After spending barely a year 
in jail on corruption charges, Lee walked free on February 5, 2018 following the appeals 
court decision to reduce his prison term to two and a half years and then suspend it.7 The 
move immediately attracted vehement criticism against the judiciary for repeating the 
                                          
6 In the June 13, 2018 local election, the Democratic Party claimed landslide victory, grabbing fourteen out 
of seventeen major mayoral and gubernatorial seats including those in Seoul and the surrounding areas, 
thereby establishing for the first time a solid liberal leadership in the country’s core constituencies, as well 
as Busan, Ulsan, and South Gyeongsang Province, the traditional conservative stronghold and a support 
base for Park. See Lee Sang-hoon and Minu Kim, “Ruling party wins by a landslide in Korea’s local 
elections following US-NK Summit,” Pulse News, June 14, 2018. In the parliamentary by-election that 
occurred simultaneously, the Democratic Party won eleven of the twelve vacant seats, increasing its number 
to 130 in the 300-member unicameral National Assembly to widen its advantage over the main opposition 
Liberal Korea Party which held 113 seats. See Shinye Kang and Heejin Kim “Moon’s Ruling Party Sweeps 
Local Elections Across South Korea,” Bloomberg, June 13, 2018. 
7 Choe Sang-Hun and Raymond Zhong, “Samsung Heir Freed, to Dismay of South Korea’s Anti-
Corruption Campaigners,” The New York Times, February 5, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/samsung-lee-jae-yong-appeal.html. The initial court 
decision of August 25, 2017 had sentenced Lee to five years in prison and was hailed as a key milestone in 
the country’s long-running campaign against corruption. See Choe Sang-Hu, Jeyup S. Kwaak and Paul 
Mozur, “Samsung Verdict Sends a Tough New Message to South Korea Inc.,” The New York Times, August 
25, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/business/samsung-bribery-embezzlement-conviction-jay-
lee-south-korea.html.  
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practice of treating business tycoons with a mere slap on the wrist and, once again, sending 
the message that chaebol,8 large family-run conglomerates that dominate South Korean 
economic life, sit above the law and that Samsung, the largest and the most influential of 
them all, is virtually untouchable. The chaebol structure originating in the elder Park’s 
economic development plan of the 1960s, and the deep social inequalities and popular 
resentment that it perpetuates, in short, are still very much intact in the South Korean 
society.  
 In this essay, I analyze the causes of the candlelight protests of 2016-2017 with a 
view to investigating the distinctive characteristics of political protests in South Korea. I 
argue that while the common understanding of political protest is that it is a sign of a 
successful democracy and a symptom of healthy civil society, the South Korean situation 
suggests an alternative perspective; that it is instead an indication of a serious political 
dysfunction and an absence of an unconditional support for democracy. While the protests 
of 2016-2017 may have succeeded in ousting Park from office, they nonetheless did not 
lead to meaningful changes that the people have called for—a case in point is the recent 
release of Samsung’s Lee from prison. Given such circumstances, the events of 2016-2017 
raise questions whether there are cultural and historical barriers that make the Western 
notions of constitutionalism, rights and liberty particularly difficult to take root. In the 
context of often reactive and immediate, rather than enduring and long-term solutions to 
                                          
8 Chaebol, (“재벌”) literally means rich clan in Korea. It typically refers to dozens of family-controlled 
companies such as LG, Hyundai and Lotte.  
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political and social problems, the result is a deepened culture of distrust and a greater 
disregard for laws and institutions.  
 I begin the essay with a discussion on the existing theoretical reflections on 
political protest in contemporary democracies. Then, I analyze the causes of the 2016-2017 
candlelight protests that led to the impeachment of Park. I explain that the massive public 
demonstrations were motivated by two factors: first, the personal oddities of Park and her 
bizarre relationship with Choi; second, the continuation of government practices that bear 
the mark of Park Chung-hee, Park’s dictator father. The deep political and socioeconomic 
divisions and inequalities the government induced and intensified through discriminatory 
and unfair practices, I argue, are what fueled popular anger and resentment, prompting 
South Koreans to launch a nationwide campaign calling for Park’s ouster. In the third 
section, I discuss the characteristics of political protests in South Korea which make the 
candlelight protests of 2016-2017 more a cause for concern rather than celebration.  
   
Political Protests in Contemporary Democracies  
 In her 1970 essay Civil Disobedience, Hannah Arendt celebrated the phenomenon 
of the same name. Writing in the era of civil rights and student movements, she discerned 
an enormous potential in it, viewing it as an innovative and a highly effective means to 
revitalize the “revolutionary spirit” of the American Republic at its birth that had long 
disappeared from political life. In her view, civil disobedience was not simply compatible 
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with constitutional government or, in her own words, the “spirit of American laws”;9 its 
participants deserved a place—and a central one at that—in the decision-making to 
“influence and ‘assist’ Congress by means of persuasion, qualified opinion, and the 
numbers of their constituents” by being “always present and to be reckoned with in the 
daily business of government.”10 Her admiration and enthusiasm for this particular mode 
of protest was indeed indisputable. “It would be an event of great significance,” she wrote, 
“to find a constitutional niche for civil disobedience—of no less significance, perhaps, than 
the event of the founding of the constitution libertatis, nearly two hundred years ago.”11 
 As history tells us, the proposal for an institutionalization of civil disobedience did 
not amount to anything more than Arendt’s personal recommendation for a legal and 
institutional reform. Still, Arendt’s assessment of civil disobedience as a phenomenon that 
merits a serious theoretical as well as practical consideration was, as history again tells us, 
could not have been more astute. Today, civil disobedience and other forms of political 
protest—whether in the form of signing a petition, boycotting, marching peacefully, 
demonstrating legally or occupying facilities illegally—are a recurrent theme in 
contemporary democracies. In what follows, I describe some of the key observations and 
assertions that have been made in reference to the emergence, objectives, and the outcomes 
                                          
9 See “Civil Disobedience,” in Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil 
Disobedience; On Violence; Thought on Politics and Revolution. 1st Ed New York: Harcourt Brace and 
Company, 1972, 99.  
10 Ibid., 101. Arendt argues that institutionalizing civil disobedience may be the “best possible remedy for 
this ultimate failure of judicial review.”  
11 See Arendt, “Civil Disobedience,” 83-84.  
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of political protest in contemporary democracies.  
 First, political protest strengthens representative governance by encouraging 
active citizen participation in political life and building a symbiotic relationship between 
the state and civil society. As Dieter Rucht has pointed out, in the past, contentious politics 
was often viewed as a threat to democracy—an irrational, dangerous force that disrupts the 
political system and undermines the integrity of the existing laws and institutions.12 Today, 
it is widely agreed that protest activities and social movements are compatible with 
institutionalized political system, if not complementary, because they can help shape and 
influence party politics and the electoral process. “Social movements,” J. Craig Jenkins 
and Bert Klandermans commented, “constitute a potential rival to the political 
representation system and can play a major role in restructuring the relationship between 
the state and civil society.”13 The agenda of non-institutionalized activities, in other words, 
is not at odds with those of institutionalized politic, but rather, overlap. Social movements 
therefore must be studied and understood in the context of, what Jack Goldstone called, a 
“dynamic relational field” in which the interests and goals of all actors—including the state, 
allied and counter-movement groups as well as the general public—exert influence on the 
activity and outcomes of the movements themselves.14 
                                          
12 Dieter Rucht, “The Spread of Protest Politics,” in Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 708-723.  
13 J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on 
States and Social Movements. Social Movements, Protest, and Contention; v. 3. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1995), 5.  
14 Jack Goldstone, "More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to 
Relational Fields." Theory and Society 33, no. 3 (2004): 333-65. 
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 Second, political protest helps cultivate responsible and engaged citizens who are 
able to make informed decisions and are committed to achieving political goals. As Carol 
Pateman has emphasized, it has an educative dimension; promoting individual moral and 
political development and fostering feelings of belonging and self-worth—since it suggests 
that individual participation matters and can help increase the quality of democracy.15 The 
assumption is that a greater democratic legitimacy comes from a greater public 
participation which also helps augment government accountability and establish a 
transparent decision-making process. 16  By way of collective action, individuals take 
responsibility for their own action, learn to see beyond their personal and immediate needs 
and acquire a broader perspective from which they can identify issues of common concern 
and search for a solution that is in the best interest of all.  
 Third, political protest is a vehicle for societal change that sits outside formal and 
established political channels. In this sense, it is, by nature, extra-legal and extra-
institutional. The eminent political theorist Robert Dahl once remarked: 
 
[I]n so far as there is any general protection in human society against the 
deprivation by one group of the freedom desired by another, it is probably not to 
be found in constitutional form. It is to be discovered, if at all, in extra-
                                          
15 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: University Press, 1970).   
16 Laura Morales, Joining Political Organisations: Institutions, Mobilisations and Participations in 
Western Democracies (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2005).  
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constitutional factors.17  
 
From this perspective, the strength of political protest is its ability to challenge the status-
quo and bring about positive changes to the existing situation without regard to the electoral 
cycles or any other institutional constraints. It serves as a key channel of communications 
between citizens and the elected officials as well as other political actors and furthermore 
as an outlet for any expressions of dissatisfaction that citizens may be experiencing and 
requires immediate redress.  
 Indeed the common theme among all of these observations and assertions is that 
political protest is a positive development in the history of contemporary democracies—
that it is a friend of democracy rather than an enemy. However, the case of South Korea, 
as I illustrate in this essay, problematizes political protest, providing an alternative portrait 
that is much less flattering. To be fair, the previous discussions do shed some light on the 
experience of the recent candlelight protests. After all, the events made it loud and clear 
the centrality of the civil society in South Korean politics and showed the world what the 
people of South Korea are capable of—such as bringing down a political leader—when 
they amass in hundreds of thousands, turning themselves into a formidable social force. 
The problem, nonetheless, is that the existing perspectives are still unable to account for 
why the candlelight protests of 2016-2017 erupted in the first place because the South 
                                          
17 Robert Alan Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1956), 134. 
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Korean situation involved much more than a mere popular dissatisfaction with the current 
state of government. In the following section, I analyze the causes of the candlelight 
protests.  
 
The Causes of the Candlelight Protests of 2016-2017  
 The causes of the candlelight protests can be analyzed on two levels: individual 
and systemic. The individual level of analysis centers on the personal oddities of Park and 
her relationship with Choi which effectively made the October 2016 political scandal the 
most puzzling, if not downright bizarre, case of corruption and influence-peddling in the 
history of South Korea. The systemic level of analysis concerns the continuation of the 
government practices dating back to the Park Chung-hee era: specifically, the blacklisting 
and suppressing of dissidents and forging cozy relationships with chaebol and fostering an 
environment conducive to corruption as a result. 
 
The Problem of Park Geun-hye Herself 
 In Politics as Vocation, Max Weber addressed the problem of political leadership 
in a modern state. “If the state is to survive,” he wrote, “those who are ruled over must 
always acquiesce in the authority that is claimed by the rulers of the day.”18 He identified 
three kinds of legitimacy based on which the public recognizes the authority of the ruling 
                                          
18 Max Weber, David S. Owen, Tracy B. Strong, and Rodney Livingstone. The Vocation Lectures 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2004), 34.  
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government: first, traditional, which relies on the authority of custom and habit as exercised 
by patrimonial rulers; second, charisma, meaning personal attributes that make one fit to 
lead; and third, legal, which derives from rational rules embodied in statutes and 
institutions.19 Only the second kind, the “charismatic” leaders, is relevant to the idea of 
politics as a “vocation.”20 They are politicians by virtue of their being; people submit to 
them not because they are forced to do so by laws or customs but because they believe in 
them.21 “[T]he devotion of his followers, that is, his disciples and liegemen, or his entirely 
personal band of supporters,” Weber argued, “is directed toward his person and his 
qualities.”22  
 Prior to becoming president, Park was a highly able and influential politician. After 
spending years in seclusion, Park catapulted into the political spotlight in 1998 when she 
won a parliamentary seat as a member of the Grand National Party (GNP) in a by-election 
in her native city of Daegu against the backdrop of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. She 
was reelected in the same electoral district three times, retaining her seat until 2008. In 
2004, Park became chairman for the GNP and under her leadership, the party won all forty 
reelections and by-elections, a tremendous feat that earned her a nickname “Queen of 
Elections.”23 In the assembly, her colleagues called her “Ice Princess” for her reserved, at 
                                          
19 Ibid., 34-35. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid., 35  
23 Kongdan Oh, “Outlook for Nation’s First Female Leader,” Brookings Institution, December 25, 2012. 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/outlook-for-nations-first-female-leader/.  
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times eerily cold and unapproachable, demeanor and steely character.24 A well-known 
anecdote demonstrating her quiet charisma is the 2006 election campaign. During a 
political rally, Park was slashed in the face with a utility knife by a man with criminal 
record. Park’s first words upon waking from surgery 25  were reportedly, “How is 
Daejeon?”—referring to the campaign situation in an electoral district in which her party 
was trailing behind its opponent by twenty points.26 In a remarkable reversal of fortune, 
GNP won the election in Daejeon, affirming the impact of the knife attack and Park’s 
dominance in South Korean politics.  
 At the same time, Park was more than a politician. For many, but the older 
generation in particular, she was also a beloved former first daughter who had, despite 
having lost both of her parents at an early age, put the nation before everything else. When 
her mother died, she willingly stepped in as first lady until her father too died in 1979.27 
She also never married, having stayed single all her life—the nation, she said, was like her 
“family.”28 Her loyalty towards the country was undeniable. In an anecdote similar to the 
                                          
24 At one point, Park was compared to Elsa, the heroine of Disney animated film “Frozen,” for her 
aloofness and self-imposed isolation. Han-na Park, “Queen of isolation: Park Geun-hye’s ‘Frozen’ image,” 
The Korea Herald, February 18, 2014. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140218001331.  
25 The incident left Park with an 11 centimeter wound across her cheek.  
26 Sheena McKenzie and Paula Hancocks, “South Korea’s first female president intimidated? Yeah, right,” 
CNN, March 4, 2014. http://www.cnncom/2014/03/04world/asia/south-koreas-first-female-
president/index.html.  
27 Park’s mother, Yuk Young-soo, was killed in 1974 by a bullet of a North Korean-backed assassin that 
was meant for her father.  
28 Aidan Foster-Carter, “South Korea’s Park Geun-hye finds a middle way,” The Telegraph , November 4, 
2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/10425787/South-Koreas-Park-Geun-
hye-finds-a-middle-way.html.  
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one in 2006, Park’s reaction to the news of her father’s death reportedly was not one of 
shock or sorrow but of patriotism: a check on the security status at the country’s border 
with North Korea. All things considered—her character, upbringing, and the personal 
sacrifices that she had made—there was little doubt that she had what it takes to be 
president. Park indeed made history in 2013 as South Korea’s first woman president as well 
as the first female ruler in over 1,000 years.29  
 The Sewol incident, in this aspect, dealt a severe blow to Park’s selfless image and 
integrity. 30  To everyone’s dismay, Park appeared at the Central Disaster and Safety 
Countermeasures Headquarters nearly seven hours after the initial reports of the accident 
had been publicly broadcasted.31 Her famous, or rather infamous question, “If the students 
are wearing life-vests, why aren’t they found yet?” that she posed upon her arrival at the 
scene, in the view of many, served as a clear indication of her aloofness and ignorance; she 
had not only failed to grasp the gravity of the situation but also seemed utterly clueless that 
she had not done her most important job as president—that is, protect the lives of South 
                                          
29 Last female ruler was Queen Jinseong in the 9th century.  
30 On April 16, 2014, a Sewol passenger ferry travelling from Incheon to Jeju Island carrying 476 people 
capsized and sank off the southwestern coast of the Korean peninsula. The event killed 304 people on 
board—most of them students from a single high school, Danwon High School in Ansan City, who were on 
a junior-year school excursion to Jeju Island, a popular vacation destination for South Koreans. 
Investigations revealed that the cause of the ferry’s sinking was far from sheer bad luck; rather, it was an 
accident doomed to happen due to a collusion between the neoliberal administration and the ferry’s 
management company, Chonghaejin Marine, which took shape against the backdrop of a vigorous policy 
of deregulation initiated by the Lee Myung-bak administration to help the Korean shipping industry 
generate higher profit.  
31 Claire Lee, “Was Park Geun-hye asleep while Sewol ferry was sinking?” The Korea Herald, March 29, 
2018. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180329000933. 
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Korean citizens. Indeed suspicions over her whereabouts and actions, or lack thereof, 
during the crucial hours of the ferry’s sinking continuously dogged her for the remainder 
of her time in office.32 The incident marked the darkest chapter in her presidency, not 
simply due to its heartbreaking loss of so many lives but also the way Park handled, or 
better yet not handled, the rescue efforts. 
 Interestingly, however, Park, on her part, did little to revamp her image or turn 
things around in her favor. She spoke few words of comfort to the bereaved families and 
went about doing business as usual in the days that followed. She furthermore gave hardly 
any support for investigating the cause of the incident and identifying those responsible for 
the accident. At the same time, there was growing frustration with Park’s inability to 
connect with not only the public-at-large but also with the members of her own party. Park 
apparently communicated only in writing even with her own cabinet staff, rarely meeting 
them face-to-face. She held only five official press conferences in the four years she was 
in office, falling far behind the number of press conferences her predecessors held during 
their tenure.33 Her actions and inactions during this time called for a profound reappraisal 
of her character. Her elusiveness, which for a long time had given her an aura of 
otherworldliness and placed her on a pedestal, was no longer her strength; rather it began 
                                          
32 There were rumors that she had undergone an anti-wrinkle treatment the day before the incident and had 
been reluctant to show up in public. 
33 The former President Lee Myung-bak, for instance, held at least 20 press conferences during his five-
year tenure and both Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung, held at least 150, respectively. 
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to be perceived as a major personal shortcoming that made her a president who was out of 
touch with reality, wholly unresponsive, and utterly incompetent.  
 The outbreak of the scandal in October 2016—specifically, the discovery of a 
tablet PC belonging to Choi Soon-sil,34 Park’s confidante of forty years, that contained 
over 200 advanced copies of the president’s policy speeches—validated the widespread 
suspicions over Park’s true character and abilities, prompting the first anti-Park protest on 
October 29th. Choi was an unremarkable woman in her sixties with no official title or 
position. Nonetheless, she meddled in state affairs—having her hand in just about 
everything from accessing confidential government documents, appointing and dismissing 
high-level officials, to selecting Park’s attire for state functions and managing the budget 
for Park’s wardrobe—and built tremendous personal wealth by receiving bribes and 
extorting vast sums of money and resources from chaebol.35 While influence-peddling and 
abuse of power has been a recurrent theme in South Korean politics, Choi was still an 
exceptional case because no private citizen in South Korea’s recent political history had 
ever acted with the same degree of audacity and freedom in the Blue House as she had. 
Choi was, in fact, nicknamed South Korea’s Rasputin who controlled Park and, along with 
                                          
34 Choi Soon-sil is a daughter of Choi Tae-min, now deceased, who was a leader of a shamanistic cult in 
South Korea. Choi married six times and Choi Soon-sil is his daughter of his fifth wife. Park became 
friends with Choi when Park’s mother was assassinated by a North Korean in 1974. They became 
particularly close, almost like sisters, following the assassination of her father President Park Chung-hee in 
1979. It was rumored that the elder Choi had an inappropriate relationship with the younger Park. The US 
Embassy reported in 2007 that he had “complete control over Park’s body and soul during her formative 
years.” 
35 Samsung allegedly assisted in the equestrian career of Chung Yoora, Choi’s only daughter, by providing 
gift horses and millions of dollars. 
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cronies, operated a “shadow cabinet” that made all the key state decisions and essentially 
ran the country behind the scenes.36 Indeed, as it turned out, Park was neither a queen nor 
a princess; she was essentially a puppet who was very much incapable of doing anything 
on her own, let alone running a country.  
 
The Enduring Legacies of Park Chung-hee and Their Political and Socioeconomic 
Implications 
 In their systematic and comparative study of transitions from authoritarian rule to 
democracy in southern Europe and Latin America, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. 
Schmitter wrote: 
 
[T]he transition is over when “abnormality” is no longer the central feature of 
political life, that is, when actors have settled on and obey a set of more or less 
explicit rules defining the channels they may use to gain access to governing roles, 
the means they can legitimately employ in their conflicts with each other, the 
procedures they should apply in taking decisions, and the criteria they may use to 
exclude others from the game. Normality, in other words, becomes a major 
characteristic of political life when those active in politics come to expect each 
                                          
36 Grigori Rasputin (1869-1916) was a mystical advisor to Tsar Nicholas II of Russia who exerted 
enormous influence over the Romanov family and was a powerful figure in Imperial Russia. 
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other to play according to the rules—and the ensemble of these rules is what mean 
by a regime.37 
 
Each case of transition varies in length and outcome, they go on to explain, because the 
factors that played a key role in bringing down a dictatorship may not be as relevant when 
new actors emerge and the rules of the game begin to change.38 For that reason, the events 
surrounding the fall of authoritarianism and installation of a new political order may be 
interrelated and occur simultaneously but are, nonetheless, two separate historical 
processes that merit analysis and evaluation on their own terms.39 A swift collapse of the 
old regime therefore does not suggest an equally efficient and speedy consolidation of the 
new regime; whereas some new regimes may reach a state of “normality” within a short 
span of time, others may take much longer.   
 O’Donnell and Schmitter’s assertion that the fall of authoritarianism and the 
consolidation of a new political order are two separate processes is particularly apt in the 
South Korean situation. To many, the October 2016 scandal came as a shock not only 
because of Park’s personal idiosyncrasies and deficiencies but also because it put on full 
display the aspects of Park’s presidency that bore vivid marks of her father’s legacies. Until 
that point, most South Koreans had thought that the country’s authoritarian past was a thing 
                                          
37 Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 65.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
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of the by-gone era that had little relevance to the present context. Today, the prevailing 
belief is that rights and liberties are part of everyday discourse and that leaders are elected 
to serve the public. But the scandal challenged this assurance, provoking a reassessment of 
the country’s relationship with its past and a national introspection on the status of South 
Korea’s young democracy.  
 First, investigations revealed that there existed a blacklist containing the names of 
over one thousand cultural figures including writers, poets, artists, singers, actors, and 
filmmakers who were openly critical of Park’s mishandling of the Sewol accident and 
deemed “unfriendly” to the Park administration.40 The widespread reaction of the South 
Korean public was one of disbelief and outrage that Park had retained the worst aspects of 
her father’s rule. To make matters worse, the list betrayed Park’s key public policy strategy 
that prioritized the development and promotion of South Korean cultural products. As it 
turned out, Park had been expressing support publicly but, behind closed doors, her aides 
had been busy devising ways to punish anyone who depicted Park in an unfavorable light. 
Forms of retaliation included legal proceedings on the charge of defamation, exclusion 
from cultural festivals, withdrawal of support from government-controlled programs, and 
outright bullying and intimidation. 
                                          
40 Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea’s Blacklist of Artists Adds to Outrage Over Presidential Scandal,” The 
New York Times, January 12, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-president-
park-blacklist-artists.html?mcubz=1&_r=0. The discovery of the blacklist sent several of Park’s top aides to 
prison-including her chief of staff and former culture ministers—on the charges of perjury, conspiracy, and 
violation of the freedom of speech and expression. 
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 On the one hand, however, the appearance of a blacklist was not entirely surprising. 
In August 2013, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Korean counterpart to the US 
Central Intelligence Agency, accused a far-left lawmaker Lee Seok-ki of the United 
Progressive Party of plotting an overthrow of the South Korean government in the case of 
war with North Korea. It claimed that Lee had organized a secret group of 130 members 
who allegedly had ties with North Korea and directed them to attack major South Korean 
infrastructure if the escalation of tension between the two Koreas led to an armed conflict. 
Lee denied all charges against him and his party members claimed that the case was a 
witch-hunt in an effort to cover up the ongoing investigation on the involvement of the NIS 
in manipulating the 2012 presidential election. Nevertheless, he was indicted on the charges 
of plotting a pro-North insurrection and violating the National Security Act. He was 
sentenced to twelve years in prison and became the first incumbent lawmaker to be 
convicted of treason in over three decades.  
 In an interview with Hankyoreh, a popular left-leaning newspaper, on Lee’s 
sedition case, Michel Chossudovsky, professor of economics at Ottawa University and 
founder of the Center for Research on Globalisation, commented:  
  
The arrest of Lee Seok-ki on sedition charges has all the appearances of a personal 
vendetta by President Park against a political opponent within the parliament. It is 
taking [his] words and building a national security pretext for his arrest. And in 
that regard it is not the expression of a democratic government but indeed what I 
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would describe as a democratic dictatorship—a totalitarian rule under the disguise 
of democracy.41  
 
The act of going after political opponents because they do not agree with the government, 
in other words, is not characteristic of a democracy but of a military rule, like the one 
imposed by Park’s father.42 While it is still unclear whether Park was directly involved in 
the creation of the blacklist or whether she ordered the NIS to frame Lee as a traitor, one 
thing is certain: the right to dissent, the hallmark of democracy, was covertly but actively 
suppressed under Park’s watch.  
 Second, the scandal proved that no South Korean administration is free of 
corruption. On April 8, 2018, Park was convicted of receiving $22 million in bribes from 
Samsung, Lotte and SK, three of South Korea’s top chaebol, and of abusing her power to 
help Choi win lucrative business contracts from large businesses.43 To be sure, there are 
aspects of Korean culture—specifically, the custom of gift giving—that foster an 
environment conducive to bribery. People offer and receive gifts—whether in the form of 
money, flowers, or a small remembrance—constantly as a sign of friendship, appreciation, 
                                          
41 Michel Chossudovsky, “Towards a Totalitarian State in South Korea? The ‘Left Sedition Scandal’ and 
President Park’s ‘National Security Law’” interview by Hankyoreh, October 18, 2013. 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/towards-a-totalitarian-state-in-south-korea-the-left-sedition-scandal-and-
president-parks-national-security-law/5354713.  
42 Ibid. For more information on the martial orientation of Park’s rule, see Eckert, Carter J. Park Chung 
Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism, 1866–1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2016. 
43 Choe Sang-Hun, “Park Geun-hye, South Korea’s Ousted President, Gets 24 Years in Prison,” April 6, 
2018. http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/world/asia/park-geun-hye-south-korea.amp.html.  
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and respect. Birthdays, weddings, and other important Korean holidays such as the Lunar 
New Year and Chusok, Korean thanksgiving, are all opportunities for expressing gratitude 
or reciprocating a favor. 
 Yet the entrenchment of such practices at the nation’s highest level of politics and 
business—involving large sums of money and powerful individuals—is largely attributable 
to Park Chung-hee himself. When Park took power in the 1960s, South Korea was one of 
the poorest countries in the world with a GDP-per-capita of less than $100.44 To promote 
economic growth, he adopted an export-oriented economic model, providing businesses 
with low-interest loans and trade protection from foreign competition and encouraging 
them to sprawl into uncharted territories without the fear of failing. The strategy worked, 
successfully transforming the country from an agrarian economy to one of the world’s 
technological powerhouses. In less than a generation, companies like Samsung, LG, and 
Hyundai grew into a global empire and by the 1990s, South Korea was one of the three 
Asian tigers, rubbing shoulders with Taiwan and Singapore. 
 Yet with success also came nefarious implications for governance, most notably 
the persistent practice of jeonggyeong yuchak (정경유착), a collusion between politicians 
and large conglomerates.45 Since 1987, every South Korean president elected through a 
popular vote has been linked to or investigated personally for illegal financial activities. 
                                          
44 Carter J. Eckert, “South Korea’s Break with the Past,” Foreign Affairs, May 11, 2017. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2017-05-11/south-koreas-break-past.  
45 Jeong stands for politics. Gyeong stands for business. Yuchak literally means adhesion.  
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The Sixth Republic’s first democratically elected president Roh Tae-woo (1987-1992) was 
tried and found guilty of corruption and was sentenced to twenty-two and half years in 
prison. His successors Kim Young-sam (1993-1997), Kim Dae-joong (1998-2002), Roh 
Moo-hyun (2003-2007), and Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012) were all implicated in having 
received money from businesses either indirectly or through family members.46 
 In the corporate world, Samsung’s Lee Jae-yong was hardly the first top business 
executive to be tried and receive a prison sentence for corruption. Lee’s father, Lee Kun-
hee was also convicted, twice in fact, of corruption and tax evasion. Other heads of chaebol 
who were found guilty of embezzlement include Hanhwa Group Chairman Kim Seung-
youn as well as SK Group Chairman, Chey Taewon.47 Yet none served full terms—they 
were all either pardoned or released early on a suspended sentence owing to the traditional 
leniency of the South Korean judiciary toward high-profile politicians and business tycoons 
accused of white-collar crimes.  
 Both things considered—the existence of a blacklist and the endemic problem of 
corruption—the source of popular resentment and anger that led to a nationwide campaign 
                                          
46 Roh Tae-woo was prosecuted and convicted alongside former military dictator Chun Doo-hwan on the 
charges of bribery, treason, and mutiny (pertaining to their role in the 1979 military coup and the 1980 
Kwangju massacre) in what was known as the “Trial of the Century” in 1996. Kim Young-sam’s son, Kim 
Hyun-chul, was convicted of receiving $7 million from businessmen in return for political favors and 
evading taxes. He was sentenced to three years in prison. In 2009, Kim Dae-jung’s two sons, Kim Hong-up 
and Kim Hong-gur were both convicted of taking in bribes and improper political donations from chaebol 
and were sentenced to prison. Lee Myung-bak’s elder brother was convicted of accepting $500,000 in 
bribes and was sentenced to two years in prison. Roh Moo-hyun allegedly accepted $6 million in bribes but 
committed suicide before the investigation was fully launched.  
47 Other chaebol who were convicted of crimes include Hyundai Kia Motors and Korean Air.  
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against Park boils down to this: deep political and socioeconomic divisions and inequalities 
that are induced and intensified by the government itself through acts of preferential 
treatment, discrimination, harassment, and oppression based on one’s political views, 
social status, and wealth—all of which have deep ties to South Korea’s authoritarian past, 
represented most intensely by the regime of Park Chung-hee.  
 David Steinberg, a specialist on Korean politics, argued that one of the key 
challenges South Korea faces as a democracy is the prevailing perception of power in 
society as being “personal” and “finite” in nature.48 Because power continues to be viewed 
as “a limited property,” “sharing, delegation, compromise, or decentralization of power” 
inevitably becomes “a zero-sum game, always with a loser of such power and the prestige 
associated with it.”49 From this winner-takes-all perspective, being born into the “winning 
side” gives one an unsurmountable advantage in every aspect of life over those on the 
“losing side.” Hence, the common Korean saying, “eogulhamyeon chulsehara” (억울하면 출
세하라)”—which roughly translates along the lines of “if you think you have been treated 
unfairly or unjustly, you’d better succeed”—is less an aphorism about work ethics or 
individual achievement than it is a profound life lesson that teaches people that the only 
way to overcome discrimination and unequal treatment in the South Korean society is to 
situate oneself above the law through professional success and elevated social standing. 
                                          
48 David Steinberg, “Continuing Democratic Reform: The Unfinished Symphony,” in Larry Jay Diamond, 
and Byung-kook Kim. Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 2000), 212-
214. 
49 Ibid.  
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 Indeed a tipping point for many, but in particular the younger generation50 who 
are typically apathetic towards politics, was the revelation that Chung Yoo-ra, Choi’s only 
daughter and an equestrian, had gained admission to Ewha Womans University, a top-
ranked women’s university in Korea, with the help of her mother who used her connection 
to Park to sway the admissions process. 51  The school allegedly added a special 
achievement criterion so that Chung could earn points for her performance at the 2014 
Asian Games.52 Chung had also been given special treatment by professors who gave her 
good grades despite rarely showing up in class and failing to turn in assignments. The 
incident infuriated the students and professors of Ewha who, in response, launched a 
campus-wide demonstration, calling for a full investigation into alleged admissions fraud 
and demanding resignation of the school president for her intervention in Chung’s 
admission.  
 To be clear, there have been many past cases of preferential treatment—whether 
for a job or for school admission—involving the children of high-ranked officials or well-
known public figures that have been subject to public criticism.53  But Chung’s case 
                                          
50 Known as the “spec (specifications) generation,” today’s South Korean students center their lives on 
accumulating qualifications in order to increase their marketability in the highly competitive neoliberal 
labor market.  
51 Investigations revealed that Chung was in school for only seventeen days during her senior year of high 
school, raising questions as to how she was able to earn a high school diploma. Later, her high school 
diploma was revoked, retroactively nullifying her admission to college.   
52 Chung’s gold medal actually came four days after the application period had ended.  
53 But none had received as much attention as Chung’s case which came on the heels of strings of 
allegations against her mother whose numerous wrongdoings had already won the wrath of the South 
Korean public.  
 
 
 
102 
elevated the problem to a new level due to her lack of humility and in-your-face attitude. 
Chung apparently saw little fault in using her family background or privileged status to get 
what she wanted and even bragged about it. “Blame your own parents if they don’t have 
the ability. Don’t point fingers at us if your parents don’t have what it takes. Money is also 
a form of ability,” one of her now infamous Facebook postings read.54 Her remarks 
sparked a public outcry not only because it proved that being born into power was still a 
better guarantor of success in South Korea than talent or hard work but also because it so 
vividly captured the sheer arrogance of the haves and their condescension toward the have-
nots.  
 In her study of 2006 Latino immigrant marches that took place across numerous 
major U.S. cities, Cristina Beltrán wrote: 
 
While the marches were undoubtedly a compelling combination of courage, 
theatricality, and public joy, the dynamic of action and affect was far more complex 
than the media’s oversimplified depiction of the marches. In numerous press 
accounts of the marches, the audacity of immigrant action was softened by 
assurances regarding the orderly, happy, and peaceful character of the 
demonstrations. By invoking the marchers’ familial and festive mood, allies and 
                                          
54 See Lee Seok Hwai, “The Spoiled Brat,” Straights Times March 12, 2017. 
https://graphics.straitstimes.com/STI/STIMEDIA/Interactives/2017/03/south-korea-scandal/chung-yoo-
ra.html 
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advocates continually sought to characterize the demonstrations in ways that 
purged them of any negative emotion.55 
 
Immigrant actions, she argues, cannot be fully understood without considering the intense, 
and often conflicting, emotions the participants bring with them. She characterizes this 
incongruous form of expression as “festive anger”—a “complex (and interconnected) set 
of civic emotions, including indignation, determination, irony, outrage, and joy,” which 
emerges out of “conditions of exploitation, hostility, and state-sanctioned violence against 
immigrants.”56  
 During one of the candlelight rallies, Jang Ae-jin, speaking as a representative of 
the survivors of the Sewol disaster, remarked angrily:  
 
If the president had been receiving briefings and giving instructions during the 
seven hours when she did not appear on the day of the accident, and if we had been 
told to get off the ferry immediately instead of staying in our seats, there would 
not have been as many victims as there are today. This obviously needs to be 
investigated.57  
                                          
55 Cristina Beltrán, "Going Public: Hannah Arendt, Immigrant Action, and the Space of 
Appearance." Political Theory 37, no. 5 (2009): 607. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Su-ji Park and Han-sol Ko, “Sewol survivors say their mistake was making it off the ferry alive,” 
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/777993.html. Hankyoreh, January 9, 2017. 
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Others cried out loud, “ige naranya?”—which means, “How can you call this a country?” 
or “what kind of country is this?”—expressing frustration and despair over the state of their 
country.58 Both reflect an intense culture-bound emotion known as hwa—repressed or 
suppressed anger, indignation, hopelessness, despair or frustration of long duration that 
forged in the context of South Korea’s long history of oppression and corruption.59 There 
is clearly much in common between Beltran’s notion of festive anger and hwa: both 
constitute an integral part of protest and serve as a powerful force for effecting political 
change.  
 
Political Protest in South Korea  
 In studying the twentieth-century social movements in South Korea, George 
Katsiaficasis, a peace activist and an expert on Korean politics wrote, “The source of these 
earth-shaking events is a remarkable capacity for popular action—a gift of Korea’s deeply 
rooted civil society.”60 By filling up the streets of central Seoul and marching from the 
historic Gwanghwamun Square to Chungwhadae (“청와대”), the presidential Blue House, the 
South Korean people, each holding a candle or a smartphone-app equivalent and chanting 
                                          
58 Nan Kim, Candlelight and the Yellow Ribbon, 10.  
59 See K. M. Lin, "Hwa-Byung: A Korean Culture-bound Syndrome?" The American Journal of 
Psychiatry 140, no. 1 (1983): 105-7. 
60 George Katsiaficas, South Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century. Asia's Unknown Uprisings; v. 
1. (Oakland, Calif.: PM Press, 2012), 5. 
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in unison slogans such as, “Impeach Park” and “Come Down and Let’s go to Jail,” made a 
clear statement through their actions: that they will not sit idly by in the face of intolerable 
acts that violate the constitution and undermine the ideals of democracy and that, in the 
name of freedom, equality, and justice, they will act and speak to resist any forces that 
attempt to do so. When Park was impeached, South Korea was hailed as a true democracy, 
some even calling it an example that any democracy should follow and a welcome reminder 
that power of the people is still alive and well.61  
 Yet whether the source of such “earth-shaking events” is, as Katsiaficas claims, 
the South Korean people’s “remarkable capacity for popular action,” and the candlelight 
protests of 2016-2017, a symptom of healthy civil society, is questionable. There are two 
key reasons why there are doubts. First is that South Korea boasts a long-track record of 
political protests that dates back to the turn of the century. From the historical perspective, 
the nationwide anti-government demonstrations that made international headlines in the 
winter months of 2016-2017 in South Korea are neither unusual nor surprising. The first 
case of a popular uprising the country witnessed was the Peasant Revolt of 1894 that took 
place during the final years of the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1897). Inspired by Donghak,1 a 
religious movement built on the principles of equality, humanity, and mutual respect for all 
people, impoverished peasants launched an armed rebellion against the corrupt and 
                                          
61 Ishaan Tharoor, “South Korea just showed the world how to do democracy,” The Washington Post, May 
10, 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/10/south-korea-just-showed-the-
world-how-to-do-democracy/.  
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incompetent government that benefitted the aristocratic yangban class at the expense of the 
poor common people, demanding political and institutional reform towards establishing a 
more egalitarian society. During the period of Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945, 
Koreans made their first public display of resistance towards the Japanese rule by 
proclaiming their independence on March 1, 1919. Following liberation from Japan in 1945, 
the citizens of Jeju, an island off the Southern coast of the Korean peninsula, launched an 
armed rebellion on April 3, 1948 to denounce the United Nations-sponsored and American-
led general election that would establish a separate government in South Korea and 
partition the peninsula for good. In 1960, a student-led uprising, known as the April 
Revolution, precipitated the overthrow of South Korea’s first president and dictator, 
Syngman Rhee. Twenty years later, students rose up again against the repressive 
government of Chun Doo-hwan who seized power in a coup d’état following the 
assassination of Park Chung-hee in October 1979. The event came to be known as the May 
18 Gwangju Democratic Uprising. In 1987, a nationwide democratization campaign forced 
Chun to step down, allowing South Korea to transition from a dictatorship to a democracy 
at last. The impeachment movement against Park, in this aspect, was yet another form of 
large-scale popular protest against perceived injustice and corrupt government in South 
Korean politics. 
 Second, accompanying this history of struggles is a long-standing distrust of 
government institutions and a deep-rooted mentality that the only way to challenge the 
status quo and bring about political change is not to participate through formal political 
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and legal channels but to take to the streets. According to Katherine Moon, Professor of 
Political Science at Wellesley College who has written a book about South Korean 
mobilization against U.S. military bases in the 1990s and 2000s,62 South Korea’s frequent 
protests is more a cause for concern than celebration. She contends that South Koreans 
routinely rise up against the government because doing so accomplishes things that other 
democratic forms of actions cannot: 
 
I find worrisome this glorification of South Korea’s protests…. If governance 
structures were working properly then citizens normally would be channeling their 
concerns through institutional processes—reaching out to their elected leaders, 
going to the courts. Spilling out into the street is a sign of political dysfunction.63 
 
Moon is right to attribute the frequency and intensity of political protests to South Korea’s 
ineffective political system. Because in addition to the precarious state of the rule of law 
and persisting authoritarian traditions, another enduring problem in South Korean politics 
is the weak and unstable party system. In the United States, two major parties—the 
Republicans and the Democrats—have served as the principal organizational and 
                                          
62 Katherine Moon, Protesting America: Democracy and the U.S.-Korea Alliance (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2012).  
63 Tripti Lahiri, “South Korea’s protest culture gets results, but its roots are nothing to envy,” Quartz, 
March 13, 2017. http://qz.com/931014/south-koreas-protest-culture-gets-results-but-a-political-scientist-
says-its-a-sign-of-political-dysfunction/.  
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ideological force in American democracy for centuries. While membership can influence 
the party’s perspective and actions, there is a clear ideological tradition that makes each 
party clearly distinguishable from the other. This is not the case in South Korea. Frequent 
name changes are common even if not much has changed in terms of the party’s character. 
As are mergers during elections and break-ups afterwards which often send the message to 
the voters that party coalitions serve little purpose other than to win elections. Consider the 
following remark by Byung-Kook Kim on the status of the South Korean political party 
system:  
 
 …just when political society was becoming more active and diverse, with the entry 
 of new organizational actors into politics, its central aggregative institution, 
 political parties, found themselves in utter disarray. Charismatic leaders broke up 
 political parties and entered new marriages of convenience, only to go through 
 another round of divorces and remarriages a few years later, having failed again to 
 draw a mutually satisfactory formula for power sharing within South Korea’s 
 presidential system… Indeed, during this period of consolidation of the cycle of 
 party mergers and breakups intensified. South Korea was following a lopsided and 
 deviant path of political development: political society as a whole expanded and 
 diversified, but the party system became even more incoherent and unstable and 
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 political society more fragmented and disorderly.64 
 
Indeed one of the key issues that emerged from the events of 2016-2017 was the urgent 
need to reform South Korea’s ‘winners-take-all’ majoritarian party system that allows the 
party in power to monopolize both the executive and the legislature and prevent the 
opposition parties from working effectively. The political protest in South Korea, in other 
words, is best characterized not as a sign of a healthy democracy but as that of an ailing 
one.  
 There, however, is an even deeper story that, in my view, makes for a fundamental 
problem: specifically, the South Korean tendency to understand democracy not through a 
political lens but an economic one. In his study of popular conceptions of democracy, Doh 
Chull Shin noted how South Korean prioritize economic prosperity and economic equality 
over political freedom. 65  Emphasizing the low level of support for unconditional 
democracy, Shin described the South Korean democracy as being incomplete in nature.66 
What such perception of democracy implies is a paradox: making demands for more equal 
and free society without sacrificing economic security that depends so heavily on chaebol. 
                                          
64 Byung-Kook Kim, “Party Politics in South Korea’s Democracy: The Crisis of Success,” in Larry Jay 
Diamond and Byung-kook Kim. Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 
2000), 56.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Doh Chull Shin, “Mass Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Korea,” in Samuel Kim, Korea’s 
Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 50. 
66 Ibid.  
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Indeed while there is a clear anger and resentment towards chaebol, the recent release of 
Samsung’s Lee by the judiciary goes to show just how important large business entities are 
to South Korea’s economic life—Samsung alone accounted for 21% of South Korea’s GDP 
In 2017.67 In this light, while political protests in South Korea may help effect change in 
the short-term—such as the removal of a political leader—they may be simply not enough 
to bring about a long-term transformation that requires a deeper reflection on the part of 
the South Korean people and the government on what democracy is.  
 
Conclusion  
 In the end, the candlelight protests of 2016-2017 were about the status of South 
Korean democracy that had been greatly reduced by the personal idiosyncrasies of Park 
Geun-hye herself and the enduring legacies of her father—the blacklist and the deeply-
entrenched symbiotic relationship between government and business in particular. By 
taking to the streets, South Koreans sought to put their democracy back on track and, by 
all accounts, they succeeded. Park Geun-hye was impeached and, with her downfall, also 
came “the End of the Era of Park Chung-hee.” Yet building a cleaner, fairer and more 
transparent society has not been easy not only due to the weak laws and institutions but 
also South Korea’s instrumentalization of democracy as a vehicle for economic success 
                                          
67 In 2017, Samsung accounted for 21% of South Korea’s GDP. Donald Kirk, “Asia’s Richest Families 
2017: How the Lees Made South Korea The ‘Republic of Samsung,’” Forbe , November 14, 2017. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldkirk/2017/11/14/asias-richest-families-2017-how-the-lees-made-south-
korea-the-republic-of-samsung/. 
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rather than as an end in itself. It may indeed be that this economy-oriented perception of 
democracy has diminished greatly since the events of 2016-2017 and that people take rights 
and liberties more seriously than they used to. Only time will tell if that is indeed the case. 
For now, however, there is little indication that much has changed.  
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Moraga, Cherrı́e, and Gloria Anzaldúa. This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical 
 Women of Color. 2nd ed. New York: Kitchen Table, Women of Color Press, 
 1983. 
Morales, Laura. Joining Political Organisations: Institutions, Mobilisations and 
 Participations in Western Democracies. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2005. 
Noddings, Nel. Caring, a Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education. Berkeley: 
 University of California Press, 1984. 
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. 
 Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Ochoa Espejo, Paulina. The Time of Popular Sovereignty: Process and the Democratic 
 State. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011.  
O'Donnell, Guillermo A., and Schmitter, Philippe C. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 
 Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
 University Press, 1986. 
Oh, John Kie-chiang. Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic 
 
118 
 Development. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
Park, Myung-Lim. "Original Peculiarities of Constitution and Democracy in South 
 Korea." Korea Observer 41, no. 2 (2010): 221-46. 
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: University Press, 
 1970.  
Quaranta, Mario. Political Protest in Western Europe Exploring the Role of Context in 
 Political Action. Contributions to Political Science. Cham: Springer 
 International Publishing, 2015. 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Original ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971. 
Rucht, Dieter. “The Spread of Protest Politics.” in Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter 
 Klingemann, The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, 708-723. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 2007.  
Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK; New 
 York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Savada, Andrea Matles and William Shaw. South Korea a Country Study. Washington, 
 D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992. 
Sharp, Gene, Marina S. Finkelstein, and Thomas C. Schelling. The Politics of Nonviolent 
 Action. Extending Horizons Books. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973. 
Shim, Young-Hee. "Metamorphosis of the Korean 'Comfort Women': How did Han ... 
 Turn into the Cosmopolitan Morality?" Development and Society 46.2 (2017): 
 251-78. ProQuest. Web. 15 May 2018. 
Shin, Ethan Hee-Seok. "The "Comfort Women" Reparation Movement: Between 
 Universal Women's Human Right and Particular Anti-colonial 
 Nationalism." Florida Journal of International Law 28, no. 1 (2016): 87-157. 
Shin, Kwang-Yeong. "The Dilemmas of Korea's New Democracy in an Age of Neoliberal 
 Globalisation." Third World Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2012): 293-309. 
Shin, Youngtae. Protest Politics and the Democratization of South Korea: Strategies and 
 Roles of Women. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015. 
Soh, C. Sarah. The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in  Korea 
 and Japan. Worlds of Desire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
Stetz, Margaret and Bonnie B.C. Oh. ed. Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War 
 II. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001. 
 
119 
Sung-Joo, Han. "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization." Asian 
 Survey 28, no. 1 (1988): 52-61. 
Tanaka, Yuki. Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II. Colorado: 
 Westview Press, 1996. 
     . Rape and War: The Japanese Experience. Melbourne: Japanese Studies Centre, 
 1995. 
     . Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the U.S. Occupation. 
 London: Routledge, 2002. 
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, 
 Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Tocqueville, Alexis De. Democracy in America. Translated, edited, and with an 
 Introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago: University 
 of Chicago Press, 2000. 
Tully, James. "Strange Multiplicity." The Good Society 6, no. 2 (1996): 28-31. 
     . Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. John Robert 
 Seeley Lectures. Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1995. 
Warner, Michael. Publics and Counterpublics. New York: Cambridge, Mass.: Zone 
 Books; 2002. 
Watson, Burton. The Analects of Confucius. Translations from the Asian Classics. New 
 York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
Weber, Max, David S. Owen, Tracy B. Strong, and Rodney Livingstone. The Vocation 
 Lectures. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2004. 
West, James M., and Baker, Edward J. "The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South 
 Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence." Harvard Human Rights 
 Yearbook 1 (1988): 135-77. 
Yoshimi, Yoshiaki, and O'Brien, Suzanne. Comfort Women : Sexual Slavery in the 
 Japanese Military during World War II. Asia Perspectives. New York: Columbia 
 University Press, 2000. 
Young, Iris Marion. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford Political Theory. Oxford; New 
 York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
     . Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
 Press, 1990. 
120 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
 
121 
 
122 
 
 
